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Prompted by the ascendance of the far right, this thesis reinterprets pertinent aspects of
Kant's aesthetic philosophy to confront far-right political rhetoric. This aesthetic frame provides
insights into the shortcomings of a predominant rational-deliberative rhetoric, new understanding
of the resilience of far-right rhetoric, and imagines a cultivation of more open taste via reflective
judgment to more effectively challenge this rhetoric and cultivates democratic practices.
Examining key contemporary discursive examples, philosophy, and rhetorical theory, I first
argue that (neo)fascism cannot be "fact-checked" out of existence; indifference to traditional
evidence means those who adhere to far-right politics are antagonistic to anything that
contradicts what they feel to be true.
Leaning on Jenny Rice to locate sentimental aesthetics and hardened desire underwriting
what some designate as the far-right's bullshit, I locate the power of these politics in cultivated
resentment based in American historical, cultural, and temporal dissatisfactions. From this
genealogy, I suggest that these dissatisfactions, which atrophy the democratic imagination and
manifest authoritarian longings, produce dogmatic tastes and feelings that maintain and reinforce

themselves. These self-reinforcing dogmatic tastes and feelings help make far-right rhetoric
resilient.
To contest this, I propose rhetoric that would cultivate a prejudice for reflective judgment
in matters of aesthetic and political taste. If brought to engage with rich particulars that are
difficult to subsume under preconceived convictions, people can become more accustomed to
consider the specificity of situations. If this becomes habitual, then this habit can provide an
indirect means of weakening far-right sentiments through greater openness to alterity.
To locate this possibility within existing far-right sentiments, the author revisits Hannah
Arendt's examination of Adolf Eichmann. Through this, I locate a fascistic style of reflective
judgment and empathy. Therefore, I argue this existent way of judging still offers a difficult yet
necessary ground within far-right sentiments to build upon to foster democratic tastes, ethics, and
practices.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: A CALL TO AESTHETICS IN AN AGE OF ASCENDANT FARRIGHT POLITICS
An Interpretation of “Aesthetics”
In regard to rhetorical projects confronting far-right politics, this work argues that a
deliberative-rationalistic approach to rhetoric is insufficient, that an attraction to or taste for the
far-right style contributes to this insufficiency, and that inculcating a taste for reflection within
aesthetic preferences can open the possibility for undermining rightwing tastes and developing
new and better ones. Without fully abandoning the traditional notions of rationality, credibility,
and expertise, I argue for informing and creating rhetoric with taste and feeling as its basis to
contest the ascendance of anti-democratic and authoritarian politics. My approach considers the
aesthetic aspects of the far right in particular and in the United States more generally and
suggests that such aesthetics may be contested.
At first glance, it may appear that aesthetics and political rhetoric have little relation to
each other. What do shape, color, form etc. have to do with the real and pressing political
questions of the day? Further, some may rightly caution that attention to aesthetic considerations,
if detached from political concerns, risks being counterproductive to addressing such concerns.
For example, analyzing the style of “tiki-torch” rallies, the formal qualities of neo-Nazi rituals,
or the appeals of the imagery of phrases like “build the wall” risks drawing attention away from
the lived sufferings of others. Rather than engage the symbolic trappings of anti-democratic
discourses, this political moment demands material change. Indeed, Marx’s famous 11th thesis on
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Feuerbach, “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world, the point is to change it” may
be applied to this context.1 Criticism must have relevance to improving the world.
Concerns about the traditional disconnectedness of aesthetic matters from political
matters in the West are not without warrant. If aesthetic considerations had little relation to
politics, then it would be inadvisable to engage in aesthetic considerations because they would
detract from political ones. Yet, by offering a broader and more nuanced consideration of the
meaning of “aesthetic,” I hope to assuage if not extinguish such concerns. Moreover, I hope to
display the inexorable link between aesthetic questions, (i.e. questions related to taste, attraction,
and repulsion), and how people feel, act, and judge politically. I understand aesthetics, ethics,
and politics to be enmeshed. Through their enmeshed character, I suggest it is possible and
necessary to tackle far-right authoritarian and resentful politics through encouragement and
discouragement of particular tastes. For example, Jeremy Engel’s Politics of Resentment
persuasively describes the relatedness between resentful styles of rhetoric and material and
political violence.2 Also, at least as important as this is the cultivation of a reflective orientation
to judgments of taste in general.3 Resorting to reflection when making judgments would, with
any luck, open individuals to consideration of different tastes. I believe this approach to
inculcating taste relative to judgment may even lead to “leaving behind” old tastes and adoption
of new tastes. Such tastes include appreciating the complexities of particular happenings,
respecting evidence to inform judgments, and valuing changes in one’s thoughts and practices.

1

Karl Marx, German Ideology, (London: Electric Book Company, 2000), 170.
Jeremy Engels, The Politics of Resentment, (University Park: The Pennsylvania State
University Press, 2015).
3
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. James Creed Meredith, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2007).
2
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Cultivating reflection is a way to cultivate a taste for democratic discourse and practices that
contest anti-democratic discourse and practices.
In this introduction, I discuss the aesthetic dimension of contesting far-right authoritarian
politics and the need for cultivating a taste for reflection, followed by an outline of the
subsequent chapters. I describe the terrain of taste following Kant and French philosopher Luc
Ferry. From them, differences in taste become apparent. Differences in political taste need to be
addressed, especially when some tastes are contrary to democratic discourse, ethics, and projects.
The taste for anti-democratic, far-right politics that is prevalent today globally must be contested
and changed to maintain democratic discourse and politics. With this need to cultivate different
tastes, I locate the possibility of this through the communicability of taste with others. Discourse
about taste can change habits by encouraging a reflective attitude. To sketch the complex terrain
of taste, I then lean on Schiller and Marcuse to describe the understanding of aesthetics that
informs this project.
Working from the communicability of rhetorical tastes, I sketch the rhetorical style of the
American far right. Following Richard Hofstadter, I interpret this style as “paranoid.”4 I trace a
history of right-wing paranoia from the beginnings of the United States, through the nomination
of Barry Goldwater for president, to the contemporary situation. The paranoid right-wing style
appears immunized against contrary interpretations, contributing to its resilience and impeding
democratic discourse. To contest this paranoid dogmatic style, I argue the aesthetic appeal of this
style needs to be challenged through the cultivation of habits of reflective judgment. One must

4

Richard Hofstadter, “The Paranoid Style in American Politics,” Harper’s Magazine, Nov,
1964.
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become open to changing tastes for changes to occur. Otherwise, it is too easy to maintain
existing aesthetic inclinations, disinclinations, and their related politics.

The Communicability of Taste
Accordingly, if aesthetic considerations are at play in ethical judgments and motivate
political behavior, then this aspect should be taken into consideration in communicative projects
hoping to contest the neo-fascist tendencies. Moreover, qualitative political changes appear to
necessitate changes in existing aesthetic preferences, the creation of new ones – in a word,
aesthetic education toward more ethical being-in-the-world. More immediately, those who hope
to contest far-right politics cannot presuppose that their opponents share their own taste for
democracy. To use contemporary psychoanalyst Adam Phillip’s turn of phrase, many want to
merely “fit in rather than create the taste by which they might be judged.”5 Applying this to the
context of this project, this is to say that while it is easier to not engage in differences of political
and ethical taste, especially when more “solid” questions like those of factuality are already
difficult enough, it is more risky not to engage in this difficult yet necessary task of cultivating
taste. When questions of ethico-political taste are insufficiently addressed, the possibility of
meaningful communication with those whose tastes are problematic is, at best, limited if not
impossible. To illustrate, it is unlikely that someone who is attracted to a US-Mexico border wall
could even listen to, let alone be swayed by, “proper” ethical, political, and economic arguments
against a wall, unless that attraction is contested aesthetically. More generally, without working
to create the tastes that make possible meaningful reflection, opponents of neo-fascistic politics

5

Adam Phillips, “A Mind is a Terrible Thing to Measure,” New York Times, Feb. 26, 2006.
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cannot even hope to challenge, let alone best, the appeal of such politics for those with
sympathetic tastes.
In order to cultivate new tastes and a better form of aesthetic judgment to challenge farright politics one must ask, “how might tastes change?” Or, "what are conditions for the
possibility of changing people’s tastes?" Through experience, we know that people’s tastes do, in
fact, change. From developing a disgust for saccharine foods when moving from childhood into
adulthood, through the university student who comes to find the politics of her parents
distasteful, to the parent who comes to prefer the style of more relaxed and conservative-fitting
clothing over the eccentric, “fashion-forward,” and tight-fit of their youth, all of these examples
show that tastes can, and do change.
Provisionally, an answer lies in the potential to communicate about matters of taste with
one another. French philosopher Luc Ferry speaks to the challenging, though nevertheless
possible communication of tastes. He cites Hume’s statement, “The great variety of Taste, as
well of opinion, which prevails in the world, is too obvious not to have fallen under everyone’s
observation.”6 This variety of tastes appears to preclude the possibility of communication across
differences in taste. How can taste be communicated if there are so many differences in taste?
Does the variety of taste mean that it is futile to engage in discourses of taste? Indeed, popular
maxims like “to each his own taste,” or as Kant puts this saying, “everyone has their own taste,”
imply that there is an impasse in conflicts of taste.7 There does not appear to be some proof that
can compel someone to forfeit his or her tastes in favor of other ones.

6

Luc Ferry, Homo Aestheticus: The Invention of Taste in the Democratic Age, trans. Robert De
Loaiza, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 96.
7
Kant, Critique of Judgement, 165.
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In situations where tastes conflict, it is common to lean on the notion of liberal tolerance
in order to prevent or limit the fallout from these conflicts. Wendy Brown in The Power of
Tolerance describes this idea and practice:
The whole idea of [tolerance of another’s practices or beliefs] is that there are individual
differences – beliefs, habits, tastes, ways of life, desires – that cannot be brokered at a
rational, reasonable, political, moral level and that do not need to be.8
Religious tolerance is a classic example of tolerance. Though there are differences between
Hindus, Buddhists, and Sikhs, tolerance can allow these people to live together. There is no
“overcoming” of these differences; all Hindus and Sikhs do not need to become Buddhists or
some amalgamation of the other religions, not all Buddhists and Sikhs need to become Hindus
and so on. While these differences may not be resolved “at a rational, reasonable, political moral
level,” they do not need to be resolved for the continuity of a democratic society. In other words,
for differences that cannot be resolved or overcome through the rational-ethical-political level,
this conception of toleration can deal with such persistent differences. These differences may
exist as long as they do not need to be resolved for democratic discourse and politics to continue.
Tolerance can “smooth out” these differences without having to erase them.
But applying Brown’s description of tolerance to conflicts of taste involving the far-right,
creates a problem. For tolerance to “work,” i.e. handle differences without overcoming them to
maintain a polity, such differences cannot threaten the foundations of the polity that make
tolerance possible. Some tastes need to be resolved and cannot be brokered at a rational,
reasonable, political, moral level. For example, tolerance cannot contain a conflict between a
8

Wendy Brown, and Rainer Forst, The Power of Tolerance: A Debate, (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2014), 17. Emphasis Added.
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taste for democracy, reflection, and evidence-based politics versus a taste for far-right
authoritarian, dogmatic, and resentment politics. This is a conflict that cannot be brokered at a
rational-ethical-political level and demands brokering, if not resolution. They are irreconcilable.
If certain beliefs, habits, tastes, ways of life etc. are dogmatic (i.e. absolutely intolerant of
differences and equally certain of their way), then deliberative democratic discourses decay.
This issue has an aesthetic dimension, the repulsion felt by far-right adherents to
opposing and deliberative discourses. We hear this in attacks on the free-press (disparaging the
“liberal” or “mainstream” media as “fake news”). The makeup and practice of tolerance need to
be changed (to be maintained at all?) if it is to handle differences that cannot be brokered by
deliberative-rationalistic discourse. In his “Repressive Tolerance,” Marcuse suggests “the
practice of discriminating tolerance . . . shifting the balance between Right and Left by
restraining the liberty of the Right . . . [thereby] strengthening the oppressed against the
oppressors,” to address an analogous type of situation.9 Given that forces sympathetic to (if not a
part of) the far-right hold the levers of governmental power, such a strategy does not seem
pragmatic, even if desirable. Yet, provisionally, it seems worthwhile to imagine a discriminating
tolerance that can address conflicts of taste that require brokering but cannot be managed through
traditional rationalistic-deliberative discourse.
Related to this “soft spot” of tolerance, the inability to compel others and difficulty in
communicating cross-aesthetic dispositions should not be confused with an impossibility of
communication in these matters. Additionally, this does not necessarily mean that everyone has

9

Herbert Marcuse, postscript to “Repressive Tolerance,” in A Critique of Pure Tolerance,
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1965). Emphasis Added.
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their own taste and therefore it is impossible to motivate changes in taste.10 Failure to reach
aesthetic consensus should not be confused with a futility of communicating. Even in
disagreement, the fact that we can communicate with each other in matters of taste makes
possible changing (and improving) people’s taste.11 Short of this, it may ease such disagreements
in taste, where tensions between tastes are deployed democratically instead of dogmatically.
Indeed, Ferry cites several points in Kant’s Critique of Judgment to point to the communicability
of taste: that “he [or she] who judges with taste . . . may take his [or her] sentiment to be
generally communicable,” that “the judgment of taste allows for a ‘general communicability of
sensation (pleasure, displeasure)’”, and that “one could even define taste as the faculty of
judgment that makes our feeling about a given representation universally communicable.”12
Thus, the communicability of taste coincides with the possibility of changing people’s tastes.
Through discourse with others, it is possible to compare one’s tastes with others, such that one
might adopt another’s taste. Also, individuals may develop different or new tastes, sentiments,
and inclinations through the process of discourse.
To arrive at a more nuanced understanding of aesthetics to inform conflicts of taste that
inform political practices, I turn to Marcuse in his Eros and Civilization.13 On the meaning of
“aesthetics” in the West, Marcuse writes that the term “originally designated ‘pertaining to the

10

See Kant, Critique of Judgement, Section 56-57.
It is important to note here that the idea of improving taste is itself an aesthetic evaluation. In
other words, aesthetic judgments happen within taste; there is not “outside” of taste (in a broad
sense) from which to judge about matters of taste. However, this is not to say that improving
taste should mean, “making it more like mine.” The intersubjective character of taste, the ability
to “check” or “test” one’s taste with and through others seems to be an important element of
changing and improving people’s tastes.
12
Ferry, Homo Aestheticus, 96.
13
Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1966).
11
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senses’ with stress on their cognitive function.”14 This connotation of “aesthetics” refers to the
“direct” sensation received by sense-apparatus organs (e.g. eyes). From this interpretation, such
organs provide the material to be operated upon by the mind or brain. For example, the eyeball
may sense the wavelength 460-nanometer wavelength that the brain then computes as the color
blue. One can imagine a similar understanding of ‘aesthetic’ for the tongue tasting sugar that is
imported by cognition to generate sweetness and so on. These sensations of blue may prompt
further cognitions, such as the correlation of the color blue with the sky, the sweetness as
stemming from an apple, or a high pitch with a bird’s song. All of these examples of aesthetics as
sensation demonstrate a strict separation and ancillary role of aesthetics with perception and
cognition. From this understanding, they are “lower” faculties because they merely provide the
material, whether the 460 nanometers of light, sweetness, or high pitch, for a separate (and more
important) perception and cognition. In essence, understanding aesthetics as sensation distills
aesthetics down to a “raw,” immediately intuitive, and thoughtless apprehension of phenomena.15
However, according to Marcuse, the “raw” notion of aesthetics was nuanced with
eighteenth-century philosopher Alexander Baumgarten’s philosophical introduction of the term
proper changing “the meaning [of ‘aesthetics’] from ‘pertaining to the senses’ to ‘pertaining to
beauty and art.’”16 The latter definition aligns closely with the prevalent understanding of
aesthetics as separate from questions of politics and the association of aesthetics primarily
referring to what happens in museums. By shifting aesthetics from the “dumb” ingestion of
objects to a “higher” appreciation of beauty and art, aesthetics comes to be understood as a more

14

Ibid, 180.
See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Donald A. Landes (New
York: Routledge, 2012).
16
Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 181.
15
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significant and meaningful aspect of the human condition. This is because with beauty and art,
there is a greater exercise of psychical energy expended than in the more passive senseperception under aesthetics understood as mere sensation. Correspondingly, aesthetics are
understood as more active in the perception of phenomena than sensation under the yoke of
cognition.
From such an active conception of aesthetics, granting that aesthetics inform political
convictions and practices, then people are not simply passive in aesthetic practices. Therefore,
there is some freedom and ability for aesthetic perception to change. The active character of
aesthetic perception begins to disclose the possibility of changes in taste. For the context of
contesting the far right, if aesthetics were merely passive and these informed far-right politics,
then it would be nearly impossible and counterproductive to contest such aesthetics, and would
mean contesting the far right on the aesthetic terrain would be a dubious tactic at best. However,
this is not the case with an active conception of aesthetics. Though still difficult, an active
conception of aesthetics allows for changes in aesthetic perception and taste. In other words,
people have some agency in their aesthetic relation to others and the world. Thus, applying
aesthetic agency to contesting far-right politics, the possibility of changing taste stems in part
from the active character of aesthetics. This agency in aesthetics contributes to the possibility of
cultivating a taste for reflective judgment, and thereby to the potential for changes in aesthetic
taste for those sympathetic to far-right and anti-democratic politics.
Perhaps most importantly to the project of cultivating a taste for reflection are the rich
aspects of attraction/repulsion, feeling/sentiment, and creativity that orbit aesthetic phenomenon
under this updated conception. With art and beauty, something about an object may “draw us in”
or “push us away.” We may be moved by it. For example, the viewer of Goya’s Saturn
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Devouring His Son may be repulsed by the grotesque figure of Saturn in the painting. Or, in the
overtly political realm, the attraction by some to the image produced by “Make America Great
Again.” As experienced, the viewer does not experience the color wavelengths as raw sensation
later cognitively derived at. Instead, the sensation is active. It immediately is taken up as
perception and judgment with the image. Thereby, aesthetics is moved into a prominent aspect of
the human condition.
More nuances are available yet under the umbrella of aesthetics. While aesthetics is
clearly more than “mere sensation” offered in the first interpretation of the term, this does not
mean it should be vague such that “everything is aesthetic” or is unbounded. In his Letters on
The Aesthetic Education of Man, Schiller describes the term “aesthetic” as “much abused
through ignorance.”17 Accordingly, he provides a means of understanding the depth of the term
without subsuming it underneath other human faculties. Nor does he make it so vacuous that it
could apply to everything.
Toward this, Schiller denotes four different aspects of phenomena—the physical,
logical/rational, moral/ethical, and the aesthetic.18 These categories should be interpreted as a
means of understanding, not to imply that these categories are strictly separated from each
other.19 While sustenance can be physically satisfying, “food for thought” logically satisfying,

17

Friedrich Schiller, Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, trans. Elizabeth M. Wilkinson
and L. A. Willoughby (New York: The Continuum Publishing Company, 1993), FN 145.
18
Ibid, FN 146.
19
From this understanding of aesthetics, aesthetics are involved with the physical, logical, and
ethical realms. Put differently, they are related but not reducible to physical, logical, and ethical
considerations. For example, the style and attractive or unattractive character of food plays a part
in how agreeable or disagreeable it is to us. This can influence how healthy our physical diet is.
If someone is attracted to unhealthy food and repulsed by healthy food, then they are more likely
to have an unhealthy diet because of a preference for what is agreeable over what is disagreeable.
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and good character ethically satisfying, “the sheer manner of [someone’s] being” can be
aesthetically satisfying.”20 In other words, being attracted to, repulsed by, or indifferent to the
style or appearance of another constitutes an aesthetic judgment of them.
Related to the aesthetic interlacing with the physical, logical, and ethical dimensions of
existence, there are different ways of “taking up” each of these aspects of being. Some of these
ways are better or worse than others. Physically, our diets may be healthier or less healthy. There
is a multiplicity of ways to be physically healthy and unhealthy. Rationally, we may have better
or worse consistency in understanding. Different people understand and enact logic differently.
Some of us may be more or less ethical than another and understand ethical imperatives
differently. And with regard to aesthetics, there are different tastes and ways of tasting, some
better and some worse than others. With difference, gradation, and better/worse manifestations in
each of these phenomenal categories, Schiller notes, “there is an education to health, an
education to understanding [logic], an education to morality [ethics], an education to taste and

In other words, if one has distaste for what is healthy, it is more difficult and less likely that they
will be healthy.
Logic and aesthetics are also interrelated. Some note an appeal of logic is its conciseness
and elegance of form. Further, there is attractiveness for some toward consistency that logical
thinking (at least) purports to uphold. Others are frustrated by the rigidity and sometime
unforgiving demands of adhering to logical constraints. These are examples of aesthetic
judgments about logic; there is a taste or distaste, feelings, and pleasure/displeasure, and stylistic
evaluations of this phenomenal aspect.
Finally, a similar relationship holds true for aesthetics and ethics. This is the most
pertinent relationship for this project. A part of judging whether something is right or not is its
coalescence with one’s taste. What individuals believe is ethical is also appealing. Reciprocally,
there is distaste, even disgust for what individuals find unethical or wrong. In sum, what people
find good is also aesthetically attractive, what they find bad is aesthetically repulsive.
Compare with Critique of Judgement Section 5. Plato’s equation of the beautiful and the good.
“If acts are beautiful, then they are good…,” See Plato, Gorgias, trans. W.C Helmbold,
(Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill Educational Publishing, 1952), 42.
20
Ibid.
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beauty.”21 Aesthetic taste may be improved (or degraded). Indeed, we may refer to such a
cultivation of taste with Schiller as an aesthetic education.
From this explanation, taste can be considered an aspect of aesthetics. In addition to
feelings of attraction and repulsion, individuals are neither wholly active nor passive in their
taste. They cannot just choose whatever taste they would like, as if one could “just decide” what
they are inclined and disinclined toward. Nor are they bound to whatever are the predominant
tastes inherited by their community. In sum, given that aesthetics inform the physical, logical,
and ethical, this active-passive character of aesthetics has implication for all of these phenomenal
aspects.
The pleasure/pain and appetitive/desirous aspects of aesthetic phenomena are important
for understanding the “pull” or draw of the aesthetic dimension of politics. Authoritarian styles
seem to be desirable to and produce pleasure for their audience. Therefore, exploring the place of
aesthetic pleasure seems to offer a richer account of far-right politics. In Marcuse’s interpretation
of aesthetics, then, he leans on the German sinnlichkeit “to connote instinctual (especially
sexual) gratification as well as cognitive sense-perceptiveness and representation [sensation].”22
From this interpretation, the sensation itself is always-already entwined with its “accompanying”
pleasure or pain. Sensation and the feeling of sensation are phenomenally already “linked up.”
Marcuse denotes this aesthetics as “sensation plus affections” where the plus indicates a preestablished and preconnected “link” (sensation and affection at once), rather than a procedural
process (first sensation, then affection). Sensation, pleasure/pain, and affect are experienced

21
22

Ibid. Emphasis Added.
Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 182. Emphasis Added.
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simultaneously and “tied up” to each other. From this conception of affect and pleasure coconstituting aesthetics, one can better appreciate the complexity of the aesthetic terrain.
To summarize, this above description understands aesthetics as concerned with taste,
feeling, attraction/repulsion, an active understanding of sensation, and pleasure/displeasure. With
this description of aesthetics, the relation to democratic ethics and projects in general, and the
contemporary American political context, in particular, may be sketched. From the above
understanding of aesthetics, the ties to questions of ethics and politics may be taken up. Kant’s
description of the relatedness of the beautiful and human beings offers a germane entry point. By
showing that kinship between human beings and aesthetics, this will pave the way to reaching a
sense of aesthetic ethics for politics in general and the contemporary situation in particular. If we
presuppose that ethics is entwined into the human condition and understand that aesthetics is
similarly so, then aesthetics also has a relation to ethics.
Taste, Judgment, and Ethics
Kant elegantly writes, “beauty has purport and significance only for human beings, i.e.
for beings at once animal and rational (but not merely for them as rational beings . . . but only for
them as both animal and rational).”23 In this passage, Kant describes aesthetics as akin to the
human condition. He does not privilege either the traditionally rational aspects of human beings
(e.g. logic, factuality, knowledge), or the traditionally animal or instinctual aspects (e.g.
sensuousness, pleasure/pain, appetite). Instead, the animal and the rational are both understood as
parts of being human. They are both appreciated. More radically, they are never wholly separate,
distinct, or in mere interchange with each other. Given that animality and rationality are both
present or “play out” in human beings, then it seems more plausible that they co-constitute each
23
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other than that they are independent of each other. While delineating these aspects of human
beings may be helpful for understanding each part, the interplay and entanglement of the two are
needed for a more holistic approach.
A holistic approach is necessary because it enables understanding and contestation of farright politics. How one understands the character of human beings impacts the character of the
rhetorical approaches to contest such politics. Treating those sympathetic to far-right politics as
simply misguided in their rationality, as I argue below, operates from a misunderstanding of
those sympathetic to the far right and the general character of the human condition. Such a
misunderstanding will likely produce an ineffective contestation of these anti-democratic forces.
The same holds true for the character of aesthetics. Classically, questions of aesthetics
tended to privilege rationality (e.g. primarily objective and universal imperatives of taste) or
animality (e.g. primarily sentimental and individual/subjective feeling of taste).24 In contrast, a
holistic view of aesthetics yields to neither privileged tendency without rejecting the truth of
either. This Kantian-influenced approach to aesthetics that I adopt recognizes that aesthetics is
not simply akin to either rationality or animality. It is both at once. Therefore, beauty, and
aesthetics more generally, has purport and significance for human beings because we are akin to
them; aesthetics and human beings are simultaneously animal and rational.
Admittedly, Kant draws too sharp a division between animality and rationality, and
understands aesthetics as only applicable to human beings. Nonetheless, this moment offers a
glimpse at the aesthetic dimension of human beings, and consequently, at the ethical implications
of aesthetics for politics. To reinterpret Marcuse, then, this understanding of aesthetics and
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ethics, “bases morality [ethics] on a sensuous [aesthetic] ground.”25 This is not to say that ethics
should be subsumed underneath aesthetics. There are things that may be attractive that are also
understood as unethical, and things that are unattractive that are also understood as ethical.26 For
example, one’s attraction to nationalistic rhetoric and repulsion for immigrants alone do not
make these positions ethical. However, such attractions and repulsion do seem to inform ethical
judgments. The attraction to nationalism and repulsion toward immigrants likely inform one’s
feeling that nationalism is good and immigrants are bad.
Generally speaking, aesthetics as taste, wedded with inclination, feeling, and pleasure
seems to be a major factor in ethical thinking and behavior. Although taste does not dictate
ethics, what individuals find pleasing, in a broad sense, tends to align with their ethics. In other
words, one takes up the ethical thinking, feeling, and acting that one does because one is
attracted to those ethical postures. Conversely, one often finds something unethical because one
is disgusted or repulsed by that thing. In essence, there is aesthetic judgment and preference at
play in ethical evaluations and decisions.
As a result, contestation of unethical politics does not occur in a completely “pure” or
“rational” ethical realm. There is an aesthetic dimension to rightwing, anti-democratic politics.
For example, hearing the chant “build that wall” enthralls some while it disgusts others. The
feeling itself, i.e. the taste of these words, and one's pleasure or displeasure with this image, play
a part in whether one thinks this policy goal is good or bad. Therefore, if aesthetic judgments are
a part of the ground for ethical evaluation and political preferences and behavior, then the
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problem of ethicality as it relates to political taste in a democratic society is that there is an
attraction to what is ethically repulsive to some and a repulsion to what is ethically attractive to
others. Authoritarian adherents are attracted to what is ethically repulsive pro-democratic
individuals and vice versa. Conflicts of taste compose the political terrain. Different tastes and
approaches to taste (e.g. reflective, tolerant, dogmatic, indifferent) seem to be, and often are
irreconcilable. Someone who finds the image of a border wall beautiful does not share the same
taste as someone who finds it ugly.
Genealogical Sketch of the American Far-Right Rhetorical Style
If we are to aesthetically critique and contest neo-fascistic rhetoric, then it is important
that we recognize that it is not an apparition that has spontaneously appeared from nowhere. As
Naomi Klein plainly puts it, “Trump is not a rupture at all, but rather the culmination—the
logical end point— of a great number of dangerous stories our culture has been telling us for a
very long time.”27 The sentiments that have more or less been status quo have let fester, laid the
foundation, if not actively cultivated the rhetoric, culture, and politics that we now live in. This is
not new, yet is not just the mere repetition of resentments of the past.28
Therefore, it is important to sketch some of the key stylistic features of the far right. This
will help provide a basis in the subsequent chapters as to why the predominant contestations of
this rhetoric are insufficient, what its attractiveness for its audience is, and how it might be better
contested. Toward this, I rely on twentieth-century American historian Richard Hofstadter’s
classic 1964 essay, “The Paranoid Style in American Politics.”29 He provides a historical account
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of the characteristics of various far-right impulses in the United States, which dispels the idea
that current far-right politics are unprecedented. Then I move to Hannah Arendt’s Origins of
Totalitarianism and Theodor Adorno’s “Freudian Theory and The Pattern of Fascist
Propaganda” to provide a modernist interpretation of a fascistic political style.30 Finally, I
consider the contemporary features of neo-fascism with political theorist Jodi Dean’s Democracy
and Other Neoliberal Fantasies and cultural studies scholar Lawrence Grossberg’s Under The
Cover of Chaos.31
Hofstadter defines a paranoid style to far-right politics. By this, he is referring to “the use
of paranoid modes of expression by more or less normal people that makes [this] phenomenon
significant.”32 As a historian, his writing was prompted by the rise of Barry Goldwater’s securing
of the 1964 Republican presidential nomination, and a political style that Grossberg
retrospectively notes as an “affective tone of the movement,” to seek the historical context and
antecedents for this happening. He argues that this paranoid style of Goldwater is an “old and
recurrent phenomenon in our public life which has been frequently linked with movements of
suspicious discontent.”33 Indeed, Hofstadter traces this from the anti-Masonic movement of the
early nineteenth century, through anti-Jesuit and Catholic sentiments persisting into the twentieth
century, to McCarthyism and anti-Communist attitudes of the Cold War.34 One can imagine this
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line extended to the present via the resentments of the Tea Party exemplified in figures like Sarah
Palin and Ted Cruz.35
Through this historical trajectory, there are key common threads to a rightwing paranoid
style. Of the anti-Masonic movement of the early eighteenth-century, Hofstader notes “an
obsession with conspiracy” and an “apocalyptic and absolutist framework in which. . . hostility
was commonly expressed.”36 This is eerily similar to the conspiratorial and absolutist character
of many on the far right (par excellence Alex Jones). Nearly everything is understood as driven
by conspiracy, and there is almost nothing that could challenge an adherent’s certainty in their
convictions.
This eeriness continues with the continuity of a feeling of loss among these political
adherents. Indeed, during Trump’s inauguration and electoral victory speeches, he claims, “The
forgotten men and women of the country will be forgotten no longer.”37 He recognizes and
validates their perception that they have been “getting a raw deal.” Anticipating this, Hofstadter
observed that the modern right wing, “feels dispossessed: [they believe] America has been
largely taken away from them and their kind, though they are determined to try and repossess it .
. ..”38 In tandem with absolutist and conspiratorial tendencies, this feeling of loss is difficult to
contest, even if untrue. This is because absolute beliefs and conspiratorial “evidence” necessarily
reinforce each other; one does not attach oneself to conspiracies unless they are already
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sympathetic to them and already convinced of their truthfulness.39 This phenomenon of
“find[ing] conspiracy to be betrayal from on high” can be seen in talk of the so-called deep state
and wanting to “drain the swamp.”40
Related to the absolute conviction of conspiracy is the far-right understanding of what
evidence means and the function it serves. In contrast to what some may argue, the far right does
have concern for evidence, but not in the same way of traditional conventions like falsifiability
of evidence and for use in argumentation toward persuasion. Hofstadter describes this orientation
toward evidence: “the paranoid seems to have little expectation of actually convincing a hostile
world, but he can accumulate evidence in order to protect his [or her] cherished convictions from
[others].”41 In short, the paranoid style does not engage in good faith from a more rationalistic
understanding of persuasion. Evidence is not for persuading others as much as it is for preventing
the possibility of being persuaded.
Given this ambivalence toward persuasion of others in a traditional sense, there are at
least two important notes to gather about the paranoid style of the far right. First, is the meaning
of “evidence.” Conventionally, evidence is sought to create, inform, and potentially modulate a
position. Evidence may be disputed, but once agreed upon, it can potentially become a
motivating factor in changing one’s attitudes. Following this model, someone may be skeptical
of climate change, but then be swayed after seeing photographic evidence of glacial melting or
increased carbon density readings in an Arctic ice sample.
39
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In contrast, evidence means something different within a paranoid style. Rather than
being a means of informing one’s position, instead, evidence almost exclusively serves one’s
pre-established attitudes. From this approach, evidence and what one feels and believes to be true
almost never come into conflict. The evidence of a paranoid style reflects one’s beliefs, this
evidence does not challenge or inform them in good faith (i.e. where the evidence can prompt a
reevaluation and potential change in one’s convictions). For example, Hofstadter cites the retired
candy manufacturer Robert H. Welch’s purported knowledge that President Eisenhower was a
communist “based on an accumulation of detailed evidence so extensive and so palpable that it
seems to put this conviction beyond any reasonable doubt,” (Hofstadter dubs Welch as the
successor to McCarthy’s paranoid style).42 For Welch and his audience, the evidence confirms
what he already “knows,” it does not constitute knowledge. This is to say that the evidence
appears conclusive to a paranoid style because it complements their pre-established desires and
sentiments.
This type of “evidence” is not aimed to persuade others. It demands acceptance and
compliance rather than prompting reflection and judgment. Put simply, this alternative evidence
corresponds to an alternative type of persuasion, one concerned with the maintenance of one’s
convictions and in-group status.43 Further, if this “evidence” merely serves to maintain and
reinforce one’s preexisting attitudes, then one must already have this attitude present. Even if
only latently, this attitude must be present to “take hold” for sympathetic audiences. Once one
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has become paranoid, then evidence changes its status to upholding paranoid convictions.
However, paranoid evidence is not persuasive unless one is already amenable to the style. This is
because those who adhere to a more rational-deliberative notion of evidence are unlikely to be
persuaded by paranoid evidence. For instance, the forty-fifth president claimed, “In many places
the same person in California votes many times. They always like to say, 'Oh that's a conspiracy
theory.' It's not a conspiracy theory. Millions and millions of people and it's very hard because
the state guards their records." Unless one is already sympathetic to the convictions that the
president garnered more votes, won the biggest landslide, or is trying to be removed by the “deep
state” etc., then this evidence is not persuasive.44 Therefore, such evidence cannot create or alter
attitudes, only maintain and magnify them. For this evidence to have any weight, supportive
attitudes must already be present.
This shift in the character and purpose of evidence changes the discursive terrain. Using
September 11th conspiracy theories for her basis, Jodi Dean in her Democracy and Other
Neoliberal Fantasies asks if the ascendance of (false) certainty is contributing to conditions that
“[concern] the possibility for knowledge and credibility.”45 At least as contemporary happenings
have been playing out discursively, it seems safe to answer in the affirmative. The contradiction
of climate science in environmental and economic policy is one of many examples of the “brave
new world” we find ourselves in. Democratic societies in the present moment are wrestling with
the paradoxical prospect that those with power are increasingly understood to “have the facts”
and the facts increasingly are understood as aligned with individuals one is are already
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sympathetic to. Reformulating Nietzsche’s famous assertion, facts are tailored to interpretations
that fit one’s preexisting taste, if they are adhered to at all.46 Evidence almost always confirms,
rather than challenges one’s convictions. It rarely serves as a prompt for or means of reflection in
judging.
Moreover, an important aspect of this phenomenon is the maintenance of group character
and cohesion in what is taken up as evidence and its relationship to affect and understanding.
Expanding upon Hofstadter’s understanding of paranoid evidence, Dean asks, “what if the socalled facts circulate tribally, consolidating communities of the like-minded even as they fail to
impress—or even register to—anyone else.”47 Instead of evidence informing one’s choice of
group identity, one’s evidence is a de facto indicator of group identity. Under such a “groupthink” approach, people do not read Breitbart News and then become convinced of their
convictions. People read Breitbart News because they are already sympathetic to or convinced of
their convictions. They coincide with their perception of the world.
Taking up the aesthetic aspect of this perception, sympathetic aesthetic tastes can account
for complementary ways of perceiving others and the world. Extending the above example, one
reads Breitbart because it is appealing, because of the reader’s attraction to this understanding of
the world and related sympathetic ways of perceiving the world. In other words, having a similar
taste, at least as much as the taste “itself,” motivates the attraction. When a friend puts Revolver
by The Beatles onto the turntable, I am attracted to the fact we have a similar taste for this album
as much as that we are listening to Revolver. Or, as Arendt puts it, “By communicating one’s
feelings, one’s displeasures and disinterested delights, one tells one’s choices and chooses one’s
46
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company [community or group].”48 Complimentary taste appears to be an important part of
group identity as much as the specific content of group beliefs.
Accordingly, tastes and beliefs should not only be approached in an epistemic manner.
The aesthetic-social or intersubjective character of group beliefs need to be confronted to counter
the far-right paranoid style. Without addressing the feelings and tastes that inform and motivate
these understandings, oppositional rhetorics will have limited success. This is equally difficult as
it is necessary. If what one believes to be true is tied with deep anti-reflective or dogmatic group
taste and feelings, such taste and feelings are essential to who one is. This is to say that such
attitudes are a part of one’s character and style of being. To reorient far-right aesthetics is to
reorient who its adherents are. In a sense, it is to encourage them to become different people.
When what we believe to be true and good is intimately linked with our taste and feelings (i.e.
our aesthetic comportment), and these are anti-reflective or dogmatic, then changing aesthetic
attitudes is necessary to motivating changes in what one finds to be true/untrue and good/bad.
For this change to occur, dogmatic aesthetic attitudes must be confronted; an opening must be
created to “revise” one’s aesthetic perception if one is to change and if one’s interpretation of
truth and ethics are to change.
Aesthetic tastes and feelings of dogmatic groups in general, and far-right groups in
particular, then, seem to cement group convictions. Concerning September 11th conspiracy
theories, Dean writes, “The jouissance connecting each fact to another produces certainty as an
effect—it feels true (we can feel it in our gut).”49 Aesthetics orient people toward understandings
of truth and goodness. Therefore, the dogmatic convictions of the far right suggest dogmatic
48
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aesthetic attitudes; certain feelings lend themselves to certain convictions. For example,
resentment feels true and righteous for those who are resentful. Thus, if the intuitiveness of the
far right informs the certainty and dogmatism of their convictions, such intuitions must be
challenged to undermine this certainty and dogmatism. That is, the aesthetic pull toward these
politics needs to be undercut and reoriented or changed for a chance of contesting these politics.
Undercutting dogmatism could provide an opening for different aesthetics to motivate one’s
politics, different ways of feeling to inform one’s judgments, and different tastes that informs
one’s attitudes. This opening could clear the way for better aesthetics and ways of judging
political matters.
Against the possibility of such an opening, (potentially) supportive attitudes for a
paranoid far-right political style are present in the American context (at the very least). With
figures ranging from McCarthy and Goldwater to Palin and Trump, it is clear there is a basis for
support. As Hofstadter writes:
Certain religious traditions, certain social structures and national inheritances, certain
historical catastrophes or frustrations may be conducive to the release of [paranoid]
psychic energies, and to situations in which they can more readily be built into mass
movements or political parties . . . American experience[s] [of] ethnic and religious
conflict have plainly been a major focus for militant and suspicious minds of this sort.50
Certainly then, under these circumstances there is a vast array of social and cultural material in
the United States in which to embed such convictions.
Rhetorically, this is why discourse disputing or calling into question the evidence of those
with this paranoid style has limited influence. If one presupposes a traditional understanding of
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evidence with someone of a paranoid style, then they will be unlikely to break the pattern of
calcified convictions because evidence for the paranoid style serves to reinforce far-right
convictions. This is because one must confront the attractiveness of far-right convictions and this
vicious cycle of “overdetermined” judgment that sustains them if one is to alter attitudes.
Conversely, there is the sense that far-right claims and evidence are trying to convince others
who are not already sympathetic to their ideas.
There is, then, a double bind. Misunderstanding the meaning and purpose of the evidence
within far-right rhetoric leaves those who hope to rhetorically contest such politics in a
precarious situation because they operate on the wrong terrain. Preliminarily, rather than dispute
or undermine the evidence or claims of a paranoid style, rhetoricians should seek ways to disrupt
this vicious process of primarily (if not only) seeking and accepting “evidence” that only serves
to reinforce one’s existing convictions. As a play on the Kantian phrase, I interpret this approach
to conviction and evidence as a form of overdetermined judgment. While Kant designates
determinate judgment as presupposing the rule/principle and applying it to the particular case at
hand, overdetermined judgment finds all particulars to reinforce their universal conviction.51 In
other words, there is no application of universals to particulars in overdetermined judgment; all
particulars are believed to adhere to preexisting absolutes, ipso facto in accord with dogmatic
beliefs. In what Arendt describes as the desire of the masses for consistency, Hofstadter sees
overdetermined judgment that “produces heroic strivings for evidence to prove that the
unbelievable is the only thing that can be believed.”52 The unwavering commitment that one is
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unquestionably and unconditionally right means the far right, as a collective, is almost entirely
numb to being moved by its opposition.
Crucially, it is important to note that this way in which convictions are felt is not wholly
or necessarily counter-factual. This is to say that a paranoid far-right style is indifferent or
ambivalent about traditional factuality, not antagonistic. For example, while McCarthy’s
accusations were certainly paranoid, Hofstadter concedes, “In our time an actual laxity in
security allowed some communists to find a place in governmental circles, and innumerable
decisions of World War Two and the Cold War could be faulted.”53 That is, McCarthy was not
simply factually incorrect. His claims could not completely be dubbed false, even if misleading
and disingenuous from the point of view of his opponents. To use a contemporary example,
Trump claimed that the United States has “lost, over a fairly short period of time, sixty thousand
factories in our country” as justification for tariffs against China.54 This number is correct,
though this does not inherently mean China is the chief cause of this loss or that imposing tariffs
will solve this problem. Therefore, as discussed in the following chapter, opponents of far-right
politics cannot merely point out the counter-factual status of the far right. This is because this
type of evidence is not always false and usually does not aim to persuade opponents. Pointing
out the counter-factual status will not be enough and is not always possible because some
paranoid claims correspond to facts.
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That is why I contend the paranoid style of the far right must be understood as more than
an epistemological issue. It has powerful aesthetic underpinnings. Hofstadter carefully notes,
“[This] style has more to do with the way in which ideas are believed than the truth or falsity of
their content.”55 Their affinity with and attraction to their convictions is a part of far-right
discourse. Conversely, their aversion to and abhorrence of sentiments that do not align with their
own fortify them against incursions. These conditions contribute to the difficulty in undermining
these convictions. The paranoid style is a fully fleshed way of feeling and judging, not a
temporary mix-up. This suggests an aesthetic approach to contesting the taste for the paranoid
style, distaste for their opponents, and the overdetermined way of judging itself.
Taking an aesthetic approach, in this project I consider what contesting the paranoid style
of the far right might look like from a rhetorical point of view. In the first chapter, I will argue
that a predominant strand of deliberative-rationalistic rhetoric is insufficient in contesting the
paranoid style of far-right politics. Contemporary events, such as the infamous “alternative facts”
interview of Kellyanne Conway will demonstrate that this approach is not working. Informed by
a nuanced understanding of aesthetics, I criticize these events to display the resilience of far-right
paranoid style and the impotence of the predominant approach to contesting this style.
If rational-deliberative discourse is ineffective in contesting far-right political discourse,
then one must first understand why the paranoid style is resilient to rational-deliberative
discourse. That is, understanding the symptom is not enough. Understanding that rationaldeliberative discourse is ineffective is necessary for recognizing a need for different rhetorical
approaches, yet is not enough to develop better approaches. To effectively contest the paranoid
style, one needs to appreciate the motivations for paranoid style and its consequences. In the
55
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second chapter then, I offer dogmatic taste and perception as a major motivating factor in the
resilience of far-right rhetoric and politics. In a word, the inability of deliberative-discourse to
contest a far-right paranoid style lies in the aesthetic register. It is not an error in reasoning or
simply an epistemic issue. Dogmatic taste for neo-fascistic styles and distaste for (left)
democratic politics contributes to the resilience of far-right politics. I interpret rhetoricians Jenny
Rice and Jeremy Engels’s ideas about the character of bullshit and resentment to deepen the
account of paranoid style offered in the introduction. Further, I look to Grossberg’s notion of
affective landscapes to “round out” an aesthetic account of the far right.
I argue in the third chapter that the taste for far-right paranoia style requires rhetorical
contestation if opponents of these politics are to succeed. The resilient distaste for democratic
politics and taste for authoritarian politics need to be countered. Though difficult, these tastes
must be tackled. This difficulty stems from an unreflective, even anti-reflective way of judging in
matters of taste. Therefore, to change tastes, rhetoricians should cultivate a prejudice for
reflective judgment, habits for addressing the particularity of experience, and a taste for
wrestling with the complexities of decision-making. Cultivating this orientation, this way of
feeling about intuitions, could undermine the dogmatic certainty of far-right convictions and
sentiments. Such an orientation could aesthetically open up those sympathetic to far-right politics
to more democratic, deliberative, and evidence-based tastes.
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CHAPTER 2
COMMON SENSE IS ALL TOO COMMON: SENSUS COMMUNIS, TASTE, AND THE
INSUFFICENCY OF THE DELIBERATIVE-RATIONAL MODEL OF RHETORIC
In contesting what we find unacceptable, it naturally follows that one reflexively wants to
take the most assured method to undermine and best our political opponents. It is commonly held
that addressing climate change, exorbitant wealth inequality, mass incarceration that
disproportionately affects minorities, threats of nuclear war, or the specter of terrorism are too
important to take anything but the safest and most sure route to tackle them. So much is at stake.
From this conventional, rationalist perspective, these issues are so important, the possibility of
unquestionable, neutral, and unbiased claims may appear attractive in an increasingly
questionable, partial, and biased climate. For many of the issues of concern, the problem may
appear as a lack of knowledge—too many people do not appreciate the rapidity of climatechange, the breadth of wealth inequality and its social implications, or the scale and
consequences of systemic racism in the criminal justice system. If the problem with the far right
is bias and misunderstanding, correcting this by supplying unbiased knowledge might seem
intuitive. Here, I am talking about the power to persuade from facts and its twin of common
sense—the silver bullet that even our worst opponents must submit to, that even the most
outrageous claims must pay homage to. From the rhetorical approach that I designate as
“rational-deliberative,” the careful and correct assemblage of these certainties will, with enough
effort, make us “come to our senses” and even “see the light of reason.” As John Adams said,
channeling the Enlightenment air of rationality, “Facts are stubborn things; whatever may be our
wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of our passion, they cannot alter the state of facts and
evidence.” In true juridical fashion, a rational-deliberative approach believes that facts
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communicated to impartial minds must necessarily be judged correctly and fairly. People’s
wishes, inclinations, and passions must (and will) yield to the facts and evidence.
Yet, given the character of contemporary politics and how “mad” they are, there seems to
be reason to put this proposition into question. Faith in the rhetorical potency of facts warrants
examination. If facts are so assured, how could we be where we are? How could such
transparent, misleading, and seemingly dismissible lies be so effective in directing public
discourse? The current flight from reason not only suggests putting into question the
persuasiveness of facts in public discourse, but there also seems to be cause to consider how
effectively facts appeal, affect, and move us. Said differently, what is the relationship between
facts and wishes, inclinations, and passions? We should take seriously how or even whether facts
make people reflect, reconsider, and reorient ourselves. The election and presidency of Trump
should make us meaningfully consider how facts are judged, how their coincidence or conflict
with public tastes impacts if and how they are taken up, and their relationship to ways of seeing
(or not seeing) others and the world.
Accordingly, this chapter will explore the reasons and implications of questioning faith in
facticity. Building on Hofstadter’s description of the paranoid style of the far right, I describe
what I mean by “far right” and establish the applicability of this description for the contemporary
far right. Through a variety of discursive examples, I will critique what I call a rationaldeliberative approach and argue that this approach to rhetoric has proved insufficient in
confronting the rise of far-right politics. Specifically, I look to an overestimation of the power of
facticity in persuasion and a misunderstanding of the character of sensus communis (or common
aesthetic sense) as reasons for this insufficiency. When faced with a paranoid style that is
indifferent to facticity, and has different rhetorical tastes, I suggest such rational-deliberative
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rhetoric underappreciates the importance of aesthetic taste and attitudes in the constitution of
how groups think and act politically. Provisionally, instead of aiming to compel and dictate the
far-right into compliance through evidence and common sense, opponents should woo and court
them aesthetically—should cultivate a taste for reflection that can inculcate a taste democratic
politics. This will setup a consideration of an aesthetically oriented understanding of the far right
and of rhetorics that might more effectively contest these politics in the succeeding chapter.
An Interpretation of “Far Right”
To argue that far-right politics have a paranoid style and that this is insufficiently
contested by the predominant rational-deliberative rhetoric, I first need to describe who and what
I am referring to as “far right.” Defining the far right can provide a basis for understanding and
differentiating between them and other political forces. However, too strict of a definition would
risk too sharply delineating who is and is not far right. Overly strict definitions will likely
underappreciate the amorphous, dynamic, and changing character of these politics. Appreciating
the spectrum of support and sympathy for the far right is also important in understanding these
politics so they may be opposed. Thus, it is difficult and perhaps undesirable to “pin down” the
meaning of “far right” in the context of the United States.
Still, a sketch of these politics is helpful for understanding them. What I refer to as “far
right” and sometimes as “neofascism” is more popularly dubbed as the so-called alternative right
or “alt right.” I do not use this term. As Grossberg describes, “the label ‘alt-right’ strikes me as
self-serving: not only does it serve to cover the differences. . . but in the end, it serves as cover
for the most hateful (neo-Nazi) versions of reactionary conservatism.”56 It appears that the term
“alt right” serves to “soften the edges,” even “airbrush” the viciousness of these politics. Like
56
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any political label, “far right” cannot encapsulate all of the differences between people who
subscribe to these politics. Yet, far right seems to better describe the reactionary character
because it challenges the normalization of these politics. Therefore, this term can serve as a
pointer for the common ascendant political orientation on the Right in American politics.
Therefore, describing the two major factions of the far right provides the groundwork for
an analysis of their paranoid style. Indeed, rather than providing a definition or set of maxims,
Grossberg argues, “only by laying [the different fractions of far-right politics] out separately . . .
one can see the frightening commonality operating in their political visions. 57 Following
Grossberg, the first major fraction is “post-libertarian” as exemplified in Allun Bokhart and Milo
Yiannopoulos’ so-called alt-right manifesto.58 They often troll with their “meme-team” (e.g.
spreading false-news). Their activities “are almost always racist and misogynist” and “adopt
many of the discourses of white nationalism and ‘white identity.’”59
A key aspect of the “post-libertarian” style for my project is their encouragement of
paranoia. Grossberg describes a primary motivation of this far-right political fraction as
“want[ing] to drive people crazy, make them paranoid, and unsure what is going on, create panic
and above all, chaos.”60 I relate this nurturing of the conditions for paranoia with Hofstadter’s
description of the paranoid style of far-right politics. By aiding a chaotic political atmosphere,
they encourage the conditions of a correspondingly paranoid style to potentially appear
attractive.
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Ironically, Bokhart and Yiannopoulos openly state that the predominant rationaldeliberative rhetoric of their opponents will not alter their attitudes or sureness of their
convictions. In their manifesto, they write, “The Left can’t language-police and name-call [the
far right] away . . . and the Right can’t snobbishly dissociate itself from them and hope they go
away either.”61 While it is a hasty generalization to argue the Left is censoring language rather
than more often pointing out the racist and sexist beliefs of the far right, this still displays the
resilience of far-right politics to any opposition. When most opposition from the Left is reduced
to language policing or name-calling, this displays the resilience of these politics to the
conventional opposition. Though likely not intended by Bokhart and Yiannopoulos, I interpret
this to say that predominant, left-leaning rhetorics are largely ineffective. Truly, the conventional
playbook will not do (and they are even telling us so!).
Grossberg's second fraction appears more akin to overt neo-fascism. He describes them
as “directly connected to earlier groups excluded by the New Right” and as taking up “forms of
white supremacism and anti-Semitism.”62 Figures like Steve Bannon and Richard Spencer
exemplify the tendencies of this fraction. They claim the work of twentieth-century Italian fascist
Julius Evola as their “intellectual” foundation.63 Grossberg explains Evola’s political aim:
“Revolution [that] cannot seek to simply change or undermine or even escape the disaster that is
modernity, it must . . . ‘blow everything up.’”64 It is safe to say that such motivations inform
their rhetorical style. Why then would they adhere to the predominant rational-deliberative
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rhetorical orientation, in part a product of the Enlightenment world they want to ‘blow up,’ when
they are actively anti-Enlightenment and favor a return to a pre-Enlightenment world?
Perhaps most importantly, I include major elements of the (formerly?) New Right
Republican Party in this sketch of far-right politics. Some might object to this. They might argue
it is unfair to place “rank-and-file” Republicans as “far right” because they are traditionally
understood as “center right.” By lumping together a sizable portion of Republicans with the far
right, such a move also risks overestimating the actual rhetorical and political power of the far
right. As the shock for many of the 2016 electoral results displays, even if these concerns are
sincere, there is greater risk in underestimating the appeal of the far right to the American people
than in overestimating it. Beyond pragmatically erring on the side of caution, were one unwilling
to label sizable portions of the GOP as far right, such unwillingness would misapprehend the
stoking of resentments already occurring within the New Right. It would not recognize the
ascendant and increasingly dominant status of “Trumpist” candidates that is part of the far right's
ascendancy (e.g. Roy Moore’s defeat of his New Right opponent in the Alabama primary
contest). It would ignore the “falling in line” of most Republicans with the President and the
unpopularity and defeats of those who do criticize or challenge this agenda (e.g. Senator Flake of
Arizona and South Carolina Representative Mark Sanford).65
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Paranoid Character of Far-Right Rhetoric
Accordingly, I draw upon discourse from the above fractions of the far right to display
their paranoid style. I provide a number of brief examples to point toward the paranoid style as a
general phenomenon on the far right. Senator Orrin Hatch’s commentary about whether to fund
the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) displays the paranoid style. In an exchange
with a colleague about whether to provide sufficient funding for the program, he states, “We’re
going to do CHIP . . . I happen to think CHIP has done a terrific job for people who really
needed the help.”66 Here, he seems to express support for this program. He even brags, “I
invented [CHIP]. I was the one who wrote it.”67 Yet, in the next breath, he puts this support into
question: “I have a rough time spending billions and billions and trillions of dollars to help
people who won’t help themselves—won’t lift a finger.”68 After seeming to express support for
this program, he insinuates that those who benefit from CHIP funding are undeserving; they are
responsible for the nation’s financial woes. Then he quickly reiterates his “support” for CHIP:
“[I do not] know anyone here who is not going to support CHIP when we bring it up and I am
one who wants to make sure we bring it up.”69
Here, Hatch displays the suspicious and chaotic character of the paranoid style. He
presents a conspiracy of “the liberal philosophy that has created millions of people. . . who
believe everything they ever are or hope to be depends upon the federal government.” He

2018. https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/13/politics/trump-south-carolina-primary-marksanford/index.html.
66
Martin Pengelly, “Orrin Hatch Comments on Chip Health Program at Heart of Social Media
Storm,” Guardian, December 3, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/dec/03/orrinhatch-chip-healthcare-program-joe-scarborough
67
Ibid.
68
Ibid. Emphasis Added.
69
Ibid.

36

matches Hofstadter’s characterization exactly, an “absolutist framework in which . . . hostility
[is] commonly expressed” by saying “it’s pretty hard to argue against these comments” of liberal
conspiracy.”70 This matter-of-fact belief presents itself as if “it is an ascertained fact,”
emblematic of paranoid style.71
Or, look to Sheriff Joe Arpaio, (whose particularly notorious tent city he jokingly
compared to a concentration camp).72 Arpaio was convicted for “criminal contempt related to his
hard-line tactics going after undocumented immigrants,” but was later pardoned by the
President.73 At the time of writing, he is running in the Arizona Republican primary for the
vacant U.S. Senate seat. In January, 2018, the President announced he was willing to consider a
deal concerning the reinstatement of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), a
repealed program that allowed for undocumented immigrants brought by their parents to remain
in the country.74 Despite Arpaio’s so-called tough stance on immigration, desiring to deport
undocumented immigrants, he did not publicly disagree with the President. Instead, the former
Sheriff expressed his alignment with the President, despite the potential ideological and policy
inconsistency: “If I was a senator now and the President really wanted this, I probably would
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back him up on it because I really do respect his judgment.”75 It does not matter that Arpaio has
previously denounced DACA; the paranoid conviction of support for the leader cannot be
undermined with evidence of ideological inconsistency. This aligns with Hofstadter’s paranoid
characteristic of “protect[ing] cherished convictions from [inconsistency and contradiction].”76
Indeed, Arendt notes that far-right propaganda is immune to ideological inconsistency and
contradiction by any incongruity “being explained . . . as a ‘temporary tactical maneuver.’”77
Arpaio can simply “brush off” this contradiction with Trump through his trust in Trump’s
judgment as a mere tactic for later concessions (e.g. a southern border wall, future immigration
restrictions, deportations etc.). The former Sheriff’s support of the President, even in areas where
there “should” be disagreement, displays the resilience of paranoid character. It is futile to try to
undermine this style through pointing out logical inconsistencies and/or contradictions.
Such resilience against inconsistency and contradiction is also apparent in the paranoid
style of GOP U.S. Representative Paul Gosar and Senate candidate Roy Moore. They both
deflect criticism and opposition through raising the specter of conspiracy. For instance, when
asked about the white supremacist rally in Charlotesville, Gosar suggested the rally was a false
flag operation “maybe that was created by the left.”78 He suggests that “left-wing” billionaire
George Soros may have funded the neo-Nazi rally. Moore mirrors this conspiratorial thinking by
claiming the multiple allegations of sexual misconduct against him stem from a political
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conspiracy.79 In both cases, there is no evidence, or more precisely, merely a paranoid style of
evidence, to support these claims. Recalling Dean, its paranoid “evidence” derives from that the
conspiracy “feels true (we can feel it in our gut).”80 Or, as Arendt writes, “they do not trust their
eyes and ears but only their [paranoid] imaginations.”81 The paranoid imagination provides
fantasies to prompt their (and their audiences’) eyes and ears to see, hear, and believe in
conspiracy.
Given its resonance with fascistic rhetoric from the twentieth-century, the President’s
rhetoric about immigrants is quite chilling in its conspiratorial paranoia: “[Democrats] don’t care
about crime and want illegal immigrants, no matter how bad they may be, to pour into and infest
our Country.”82 Many rightfully have pointed out the use of this metaphor previously used by the
National Socialist regime. However, one should not stop at this apt comparison. To appreciate
the danger of this rhetoric to democracy precisely, one needs to appreciate the paranoid style and
aesthetics of this statement.83 By comparing immigrants with an infestation, this is likely
motivated by and prompts disgust and repulsion to the tastes of sympathetic audiences. The
affective charge of the verb “infest” seems to engage at the level of taste (rather than a “logical”
evaluation). Such taste-driven evaluation lends itself to Hofstadter’s apocalyptic tone of the
paranoid style; the language of parasitic infestation portrays the United States as threatened by
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undesirable and dangerous others. Indeed, this paranoid disgust stems from “an imagination
[that] ha[s] been inflamed” by paranoid fantasy with effects that are all-too real.84
Rational-Deliberative Overconfidence in Facticity
The rationalist-deliberative approach to contesting the far right is overconfident in its
understanding of the persuasive power of facts. Typically, this approach operates as if correcting
counter-factual claims with facts will undermine such claims and motivate changes in political
thinking, acting, and feeling. Such an approach to rhetoric also appears with a “matter-of-fact”
attitude; it does little to appeal to those sympathetic to counter-factual claims. This style
insufficiently appeals to those ambivalent, hesitant, or hostile to its claims. It often does little
more than assuage those who are already sympathetic. To demonstrate, I look to some
contemporary examples to show how “compelling” facticity is understood and taken up in order
to undermine the counterfactual character of (far)right claims and dissuade sympathetic
audiences.
An illustrative example of this is present in a CNN advertisement entitled “This is an
Apple.” It depicts a red apple on a white background and is narrated with the following:
This is an apple. Some people might try and tell you that it’s a banana. They might
scream banana, banana, banana over and over and over again. They might put banana in
all caps. You might even start to believe that this is a banana. But it’s not. This is an
apple.85
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The advertisement concludes with “Facts First” written in black for several seconds, followed by
a brief flash of CNN’s logo. Contrary to the surrealist painter René Magritte’s The Treachery of
Images, which depicts an image of a pipe with the provocation “this is not a pipe,” this
advertisement begins by presupposing and then proclaiming the factual status of the image being
an apple (i.e. “this is an apple”). CNN’s assertion that the image represents an apple is not likely
challenged by the viewer; it is already understood, even common-sensical. There is no doubt that
the narrator is correct. Moreover, only a contrarian would disagree: the assertion does not make
us move from the status of doubting or questioning that this image of an apple is an apple.
Relatedly, we do not move from believing that this is not (an image of) an apple to later realizing
it is, in fact, an image of an apple. Accordingly, the narrator’s (factual) claim does not attempt to
move us to a new position. Instead, it reinforces what viewers already think, and it alludes to
similarly apparent and common-sensical claims in the political sphere.
Already, the rhetorical power of this approach to facticity is dubious. First, it reduces the
complexity present in creating factual statements to something that should be recognized by
everyone with ease (“this is as simple as identifying an apple”). Though some facts appear as
simple to “us,” many require extensive work and verification through peer review to establish
(e.g. reading changes in carbon dioxide levels in Arctic ice sheets). This is to say that if there is
sometimes the need for extensive work to generate facts, it should follow that it takes rhetorical
work to display the correctness of such statements, especially for those who are skeptical or
antagonistic. In other words, if there is the possibility of misunderstanding for those sympathetic
to factual claims (e.g. that hot summers demonstrate climate-change), then it is unlikely that
these claims will be believed or will motivate changes for those attracted to counter-factual
statements. While “this is not a pipe” suggests caution for overly simple and matter-of-fact
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images, the rational-deliberative “this is an apple” equates this certainty with correctness. Such
confidence, even if well intentioned, does not address the tastes of audiences sympathetic to
counter-factual claims or apply to situations where defining what we are looking at, is not so
simple as naming a piece of fruit.
Next, the narrator contrasts those of us who know this claim to be correct with “some
people” who are not us. These other people will insist to “us” that this is not an apple, that “our”
certainty is wrong, and provide a claim that is just as certainly wrong to our eyes as ours is to
them. Here, then, is a clear division between those who understand what is correct, the narrator
and the viewer, and the “some people” who are not directly being addressed.86 “We” who
(correctly) understand that this image is an apple and “they” or “those others” who
misunderstand that this is a banana. “They” who misunderstand not only do not recognize the
obvious character of the apple, not only recognize to be true something that is just as obviously
incorrect (the banana), but then have the drive to tell us that we are wrong, that we are seeing
incorrectly by not seeing a banana.
It is clear within these first two sentences that there are (at least) two different groups,
“us” who are right and “they” who are wrong. At least initially, “they” cannot make “us” think
otherwise. Perhaps, there reciprocally is an inability for “us” to meaningfully communicate with
them. This reciprocal failure of communication becomes clear through the next two lines of the
advertisement. The “banana group” is presented as insistent about how correct they are. We
imply that they wildly scream in contrast to the narrator’s (and presumably our) calm and
collected air of rationality. There is the sense that they are assured of what they think to such an
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extent that they will do whatever is within their power to let “us” know that (they believe) this is
a banana.
Finally, the narrator explains the effect of the status of the apple being challenged with
the status of “banana-hood.” Because of those trying to tell us this is a banana, and more
importantly, the self-assured way we are being told this image is a banana rather than an apple,
some of us, maybe even the individual viewer (“me”), might start to take this claim seriously.
Our sureness in the image being an apple, at the very least, might waver. This seemingly certain
image-as-apple that our eyes tell us and we were confident in might become unsure and seriously
put into question.
How does the narrator reassure us that we are right? How does she counter and persuade
the viewer, and maybe even some of those convinced this is a banana though it is actually an
apple, that it is better to see it as an apple, and maybe even more significantly, that the way of
seeing that sees this image as an apple rather than a banana is a better way to see?
They do not. The narrator merely contests the claim by reasserting the factual character
of the previous claim that she made. Confidently articulating, “but it’s not,” incredulously acting
as if this mere assertion can truly speak to the people who are in doubt, let alone those,
“scream[ing] banana, banana, banana!” She states, “This is an apple,” as if the repetition will
finally allow this fact to “speak for itself.” To apply the same faith in facticity that will somehow
now finally overcome all of those who believe otherwise. To believe we can and should dictate
to others and compel them to see as we see, even if they do not and to do this while acting as if
they already see the way “we” do. To act as if we can produce a statement that is outside of or
“immune” to the needs of engaging in discourse and taking seriously the challenges of rhetoric
for those who do not already subscribe to the worldview and ways of being-in-the-world that
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“we” do. In short, it is optimistic to say the same thing at the beginning of the narration as at the
end, without really taking up what others have to say, even if they are wrong, and expect a
different result.
The advertisement concludes with the proclamation “facts first,” an empty platitude
when, for better or for worse, the power of facticity is clearly in decline politically. Moreover,
when facticity no longer appears as the neutral arbiter of truth everyone obeys, but instead as
tools, means, and even weapons to be hurled at opponents, then “facts first” is not an arena
outside of the political, but is enmeshed in it. Most plainly, when this advertisement that
proclaims itself to be for “facts first” is created in response to a political attack claiming CNN as
“fake news,” then it is too farfetched to believe in a neutrality or disinterestedness in the truth
that the advertisement purports to uphold through an absurdly over simplistic depiction of truth’s
opponents.
This advertisement is an example of what may be designated as a deliberativerationalistic approach to rhetoric. As demonstrated above, it more-or-less presupposes that
everyone operates through a generally detached approach to truth, goodness, and beauty. This
approach affords deference to the powers of logic, meticulous and disinterested observation, and
expertise deriving from these. It understands the human being, at our root, as homo economicus,
the rational being.
A cursory glance at the newspaper should reveal that this model of the character of
human beings is a clear misunderstanding, especially when it purports to describe human beings
comprehensively and universally. The people who yell “banana, banana, banana,” are not just
mistaken about the factual status of their claim. They do not care about a paradigm that yields to
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claims and evidence of facticity. Therefore, they do not adhere to this essential requirement of
the deliberative-rationalistic paradigm.
Far-Right Indifference to the Rational-Deliberative Idea of Facticity
If these irrational others did adhere to a rational-deliberative perspective, they could not
maintain the overconfident stance demonstrated by the magnitude of the repetition of false
statements that the 2016 was the largest electoral landslide since Reagan, or that the 2017
inauguration had the largest attendance in history, or that the 2018 State of the Union address
had the largest viewership. (A recurring size-oriented theme is apparent). If these irrational
individuals did adhere to the deliberative-rationalistic paradigm, they could not even utter these
statements, not to mention doubting or retracting such statements. Under such a framework, the
evidence of the status of these claims is unmistakably clear; we can easily compare all of the
previous materials to find it untrue. Truly, statements like these are incomprehensible from the
rational-deliberative view.
The challenge, then, is to comprehend this incomprehensibility; to understand how and
why these claims (and far-right ones more generally) are made in order to suggest ways to
counter, subvert, and hopefully best them. Further, we need to demonstrate that an overreliance
on facticity is a problematic and insufficient approach to confronting far-right rhetoric. As such, I
argue that a major problem with the rational-deliberative approach to rhetoric is that it does not
appreciate the indifference of the far right to the notion of facticity. In contrast to those who
portray them as “anti-fact,” I understand the far right as not necessarily antagonistic to facts
because they are facts. Instead, recalling Hofstadter, they seem to only care about evidence that
aligns with their preexisting convictions. Their so-called facts, or “alternative facts,” are
necessarily those that align with their convictions. So antagonism for facts as such is not the
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issue. Instead, it is the inability of the far right to appreciate and be moved by evidence that
contests their convictions.
Toward this end, consider the infamous “alternative facts” exchange between reporter
Chuck Todd and White House aid Kellyanne Conway following the inauguration of Donald
Trump. After continuous talking over one another about the press secretary’s insistence on the
record setting size of the new president’s inauguration crowd, the key moment of the exchange
occurred:
Todd: . . . Answer the question of why the president asked the White House press
secretary to come out in front of the podium for the first time and utter a falsehood? Why
did he do that? It undermines the credibility of the entire White House press office . . .
Conway: Don't be so overly dramatic about it, Chuck. What – You're saying it's a
falsehood. And they're giving Sean Spicer, our press secretary, gave alternative facts to
that . . .
Todd: Wait a minute – Alternative facts? . . . Look, alternative facts are not facts. They're
falsehoods.87
This exchange is interesting for several reasons. First, it is telling that the use of airtime is
prioritized for undermining a claim that even Todd admits is a “small and petty thing.”88 There is
the sense that if Todd can get Conway to admit the smallest error or lie that it will erode her
support. That if it becomes clear to Conway’s sympathetic audiences that she is not adhering to a
rational-deliberative paradigm then Trump's supporters will no longer support such politics.
Instead of devoting energy to questioning and challenging the horrendous rhetoric and politics of
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the administration, he spends the entire interview attempting to maneuver Conway into a position
where she has to admit that the president uttered “a small and petty” falsehood. That Todd would
devote so much energy to this minor falsehood displays this rational-deliberative impulse to factcheck, even at the expense of rhetorically contesting more consequential aspects of far-right
politics.
While Todd attempts to compel Conway to admit a falsehood, Conway is provided a
platform to promote the policies and actions of the president that go unchallenged throughout the
interview. Todd seems to act as if this will have meaningful, even great rhetorical significance in
undermining the Trump presidency. When put so bluntly, it becomes abundantly clear that this is
a ridiculous impulse to waste rhetorical energy and time this way, but it is telling about the
character of the deliberative-rationalistic paradigm that is too frequently relied on.
Moreover, this maneuver had such little rhetorical potency to Conway that she
completely disregards the adherence to facticity by making a claim that the press secretary’s
claims were alternatively factual; disregarding the notion of a single universal common sense or
way of seeing that is already universally agreed upon and that everyone therefore adheres to.
When we imagine that Todd believes he has unleashed his trap successfully, forcing the
admittance of a falsehood by the preposterous notion of facts as having alternatives, his tactic
falls flat. It comes off just as small and petty as the remark he recognizes as such coming from
the president.
More generally, this means Conway can continue to attack the press and be a mouthpiece
for the administration’s agenda. Conway can simultaneously reassert the size of the crowd and
defend the president’s “alternative fact,” while she leans on a fact (albeit a misleading one). She
has no moral qualms about pointing to the Nielsen viewership ratings estimating thirty-one
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million people watched the 2017 inauguration vs. approximately twenty-one million viewers for
the 2013 inauguration. (Trump’s inauguration was still smaller than Obama’s 2009 inauguration,
with an estimated thirty-eight million and the record set of about forty-two million viewers set by
Reagan’s 1981 inauguration).89 Therefore, Conway and her sympathetic audiences are indifferent
to the rational-deliberative notion of facticity; they coincidentally adhere to it when it fits their
convictions and contradict it when this is necessary to maintain their convictions.
Consequently, because of her and her audience’s indifference to the rational-deliberative
idea of facticity, Conway easily pivots to other topics that are more contentious and important to
a sizable portion of the American people than whether or not the president stated a falsehood or
made an “exaggerated” claim about the size of his inaugural crowd. Again, throughout the whole
interview, Conway is not challenged about the character of the executive orders Trump signed or
other policy positions he holds. Todd failed in his likely aim to “nail” Conway on a lie or, to use
former vice-presidential candidate Sarah Palin’s term, to use a “gotcha question” that would
make Conway slip up and, in effect, undermine the credibility of the President of the United
States for those who voted for him was.
We may interpret this to be, in part, because of the misunderstanding of the character of
our way of seeing, or to use the traditional philosophical term for our aesthetic common sense, a
misunderstanding of sensus communis.90 Provisionally, this is to say that underappreciating the
aesthetic character of sensus communis and overestimating what Kant calls “common human
understanding” puts rational-deliberative rhetoric on shaky terrain. Rational-deliberative and far89
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right rhetoric do not share the same epistemological concerns. This is because, as is apparent in
the exchange between Todd and Conway, there is not a single universal and common way of
sensing and perceiving; Conway’s ability to utter the phrase “alternative facts” displays that she
is operating under a dissimilar way of seeing. I will address the relationship between
misunderstanding sensus communis as universal epistemology and “alternative facts” further
after describing the rhetorical fickleness of the predominant rational-deliberative notion of
facticity.
Fickleness of Facticity
A final note concerning the precarious nature of an approach relying chiefly on facticity
to engage in political persuasion is that facts and political evaluation have a capricious
alignment. This is to say that there is cleavage between our beliefs and the “side” the facts “come
down on.” For example, in a recent fact-check by CNN of The State of the Union Address,
CNN’s so-called “reality check team” evaluated as true Trump’s claim that his presidency has
overseen the creation of 2.4 million jobs and the lowest rate of African-American
unemployment, and that the “defeat [of] ISIS has liberated very close to 100% of the territory
held by these killers.”91 If one holds a political position that is contrary to the Trump
administration, and if one’s position upholds the supremacy of facticity in the political realm,
then one is left in an awkward position. On the one hand, it is possible to find these politics
profoundly distasteful and unethical, and yet particular facts or elements of facticity do support
91
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these politics. They are not simply counter-factual. In other words, to disagree with Trump, and
to find that facticity does not exclusively align with political positions contrary to his creates the
uncomfortable problem of having to admit the accuracy of such claims and yet nevertheless
disagree with the politics of the president. Facts cannot dictate beliefs, they can only inform
them. Facticity can contradict beliefs without warranting or compelling a change of heart.
Consequently, one either needs to entertain positions that are abhorrent or admit that
facticity alone should not dictate political taste. Additionally, even if one “sides” with facticity,
the “fact” that dissonance can be felt between facticity and political desires means that there is
never a simple adherence to facticity–the nature of the world must be negotiated, including our
feelings and our desires for how the world could and should be. Thus, rather than accept
abhorrent politics because of some alignment with aspects of facticity, it seems justified to admit
the truth of political taste, i.e. aesthetic sensibilities and ethical proclivities that reject these
politics because of their appearance to us. Therefore, because of the (at-times) fickleness of
facticity with regard to politics, there are limits to basing political taste in facts, Yet, this does not
mean one needs to abandon facticity as such. Perhaps then, because people are often more apt to
adhere to political sense rather than (and even in contradiction to) notions of facticity, a notion of
truth of and from our feelings should be entertained.
In sum then, facticity as such has no exclusive friends; we can imagine a style of facticity
that necessarily tailors particular claims toward a (to some degree) preconceived general
understanding of the world. Recalling Nietzsche’s famous provocation, “there are no facts, only
interpretations,” we may interpret him in this context to mean that there is nowhere outside the
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boundaries of perception, i.e. how sense is made of the world, from which judgments are made
and acted on.92
The Rhetorical Problem of Sensus Communis as Universal Common Human
Understanding
From this rhetorical insufficiency of facticity, one may believe it possible to return to a
fundamental notion of common sense, something that we can all agree upon. From this,
ostensibly, it might be possible to create the tools to undermine the power of neo-fascistic
rhetoric. Put otherwise, even if we cannot persuade others through sheer facticity, perhaps we
can do so through the common sense we share. Indeed, if everyone shares a similar way of
understanding themselves, others, and world, and conclusions from this way of perceiving the
world manifest as a more-or-less uniform particular content that all can work from, then it would
seem that a simple rhetorical application of this universal sensibility would be overwhelmingly
moving politically.
However, the notion of a universal sensibility misunderstands the character of common
sense and its relation and relatedness to the social, political, and cultural spheres. This is because
if such an understanding of common sense was reflected in the world, it seems unlikely that farright politics could emerge unless the world was already understood in such a way. Further, this
conception could not account for the variety of ways that people perceive the world. If such
common sense was truly common, then agreement would already be readily achievable–leaning
on common sense would compel people to “come to their senses” in a similar way they
supposedly would when presented with evidence of facticity. With this in mind, I will explore
how a rationalistic deliberative style of rhetoric misunderstands common sense and how this
92
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misunderstanding relates to its rhetorical shortcomings. Then I explore the character of sensus
communis, leaning on aesthetic philosophy, to better understand the character and role of
common sense and to uncover the role of taste and judgment regarding attraction, repulsion, or
indifference to particular ways of being-in-the-world.
To demonstrate this, take an example that relates strongly to the need for an aesthetic
notion of common sense in order to persuade others. Shortly after the Las Vegas shooting,
Jimmy Kimmel, during his opening monologue, addressed the need to act on gun violence.93
Reaching the peak of his crescendo, Kimmel made a desperate appeal to a seemingly universal
notion of common sense “beyond” politics for something to be done. “What I’m talking about
tonight isn’t about gun control, it’s about common sense. Common sense says no good will ever
come from allowing weapons that can take down 527 Americans at a concert.”94 He makes an
appeal to common sense understood as what Kant designates “common human understanding.”
Kant describes mere common human understanding as “the least we can expect from anyone
claiming the name of a human being.”95 This is in contrast to sensus communis aestheticus as
shared or communal feelings presupposed as generally valid for the American public. In other
words, sensus communis aestheticus is a communal sense as compared with "common human
understanding"; sensus communis aestheticus is the a priori grounds that informs the tastes and
feelings of communities and that make these communicable to others. An uncomfortable
question that arises from this, then, is whether Kimmel is truly appealing to the lowest common
denominator of understanding. Relatedly, is this rhetorically motivating for those who need to be
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moved for action to occur? Can appealing to common human understanding rather than sensus
communis aestheticus contest the right-wing politics that prevent meaningful reforms from
occurring?
Accordingly, then, Kimmel is right that we are working from and with the ground of
common sense when engaging discursively about this issue, but perhaps not in the way that he
supposes. Rather than understanding such a level of common understanding as a yet-to-be
achievement (that we can debate the possibilities and merits of), Kimmel acts as if this common
understanding is already pre-given and constructed to such an extent that it is obvious and
accepted upon by almost everyone. It should constitute the very least that anyone can presuppose
in the understanding of others. Here is the rub: Kimmel’s description of common understanding
is already beyond the purview of Kant’s common understanding, the very least we can expect
from other human beings concerning the lowest common denominator of understanding
concerning gun violence. It is not common sense; the structure of sensus communis does not
grant us this pre-given level of understanding concerning this (or any other) issue.
This conflation of common understanding with sensus communis is most evident in
Kimmel’s next sentences. He continues by describing his interpretation of a supposed shared
universal understanding of this issue but then points to 56 senators who do not share this
sentiment. “Common sense says don’t let those who suffer from mental illness buy guns. Who
thinks that makes sense? Them I guess.”96 Presupposing the common understanding of others,
when a sizable and disproportionately powerful group adheres to a different view, is a
rhetorically questionable approach and should prompt us to reevaluate our interpretation of
sensus communis if we are to work from it toward changing the status-quo. Kimmel himself
96
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displays the non-universal character of his own claims by pointing to a majority of US senators
who do not act on Kimmel’s notion of common sense and who, at the very least, represent a
sizable chunk of the American public that also do not adhere to his view of common
understanding.
Accordingly, it is unwise to operate as if only when positions, beliefs, and attitudes are
universally shared could one presuppose and build discourse from them. Indeed, if the public
were truly in possession of Kimmel’s hoped for common sense it seems less likely like there
would be the cycle of violence and outrage in the first place or, at least, more ability to change
the laws and the culture so as to break the cycle.
A Contest of Taste: The Need for Rhetorical Contestation of the Far Right on the
Terrain of Sensus Communis Aestheticus
However, with Kant, common human understanding does not exhaust the meaning of
sensus communis. Kant offers us a different notion of common sense that reflects the aesthetic
dimension of politics. He also describes the public faculty of taste as a kind of sensus communis.
For the contemporary context, this means considering the terrain of aesthetic taste as a factor in
the resilience of the far-right against rational-deliberative rhetoric and as a sign of hope that the
terrain can be modified. Moreover, the ability to be moved to different tastes and politics is
contingent on how narrowly or broadly one’s communal taste can imagine the standpoint of
others, can reflect on these feelings, and can allow reflection to meaningfully inform one's
judgment. Put another way, if the far right is dogmatic in their consideration of contrary tastes,
and rational-deliberative rhetoric does not address this distaste for oppositional politics, then
opponents of the far right need to imagine rhetorics that contest the dogmatism of far-right taste
and not just the apparent lack of sense in far-right politics. Therefore, taste as a kind of sensus
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communis should not be conflated with the lowest common denominator of common human
understanding.
In this historical moment, perhaps because of an inability to meaningfully imagine and
reflect upon the standpoint of others and because of a default to discord over accord, there
appears to be an absence of sensus communis. It appears that many are dogmatic in their tastes,
especially among the far right whose solidified convictions Hofstadter describes. Yet, common
and potentially pluralistic-democratic tastes need to be built from and with the common tastes of
others. Tastes are not formed in a vacuum. The community one finds oneself in influences one's
tastes. To rhetorically move others toward imagining and creating better worlds, then, is a matter
of working from the tastes and judgments of others as they are. If democratic tastes and feelings
are to be cultivated, then this is where it may be safely presupposed that work should begin.
Moreover, it is important to understand that sensus communis is always related to and imbued
with particular historical content, i.e. aesthetic history conditions how able or well we are to
imagine the viewpoints of others; that is, it conditions the ground of our rhetorical situation.
Therefore, it is important to deal with the ever-changing historical content and particulars of
sensus communis aestheticus instead of believing that an ahistorical common human
understanding can provide a blueprint for discourse and practices by which to contest the far
right.
Although reliance on common human understanding is impossible, taste as sensus
communis is a ground on which the far right can be contested. Common aesthetic tastes can be
presupposed and worked from to construct different contents of common sense. We may point to
the ontological character of language and communication to demonstrate this. Merleau-Ponty in
Phenomenology Perception writes, “Through speech . . . there is a taking up of the other
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person’s thought, a reflection in others, a power of thinking according to others, which enriches
our own thoughts.”97 By virtue of being-in-the-world, we are granted the potentiality of
imagining the different possible feelings of others. This notion of communal sense, not reducible
to any particular content or context of understanding, is the form and ability to feel and be felt by
others (though admittedly is also the ground of misapprehension). Indeed, feeling always “takes
place” with and in the views of others, i.e. publicly. This mitsein or being-with is not separate
from the “I” that I am, as if I am first an individual that does or does not take up the relations of
sensus communis. I do not choose at one moment to be in this public and at another moment to
retire into a wholly separate isolated “I.” Rather, this connection, relation, and with-ness are
imbued into my very way of being such that I could not be an “I” without a “We,” or, to use
Heidegger’s phrase, a “they.”98
However, it is important to note that this ontological characteristic should not be
confused with an endorsement of our historical “taking-up” of communal sense. Just because we
can imagine and reflect upon the possible viewpoints of others and cannot help but be
ontologically social, this does not mean it can be done well or easily. And yet what is needed is
precisely to do this well if one is to confront and ultimately best the rise of increasing banal and
vicious sentiments in the public. Therefore, although the public cannot help but have a
communal sense and that sense cannot help but be entwined with its publicness, there are
nonetheless better and worse ways of developing this sense.
Applying the conception of sensus communis just outlined to the rhetorical question of
confronting far-right rhetoric and, recognizing the insufficiency of a deliberative-rationalistic
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rhetorical model, it is important to stress that the communal character of sensus communis is
intimately related to our tastes and judgment as a condition for its possibility. Following Kant
and Arendt, it is important to understand taste (as a kind of sensus communis) that is intertwined
with our communal makeup. For example, when Jimmy Kimmel points to the others who do not
adhere to the common sense he is discussing, it is not simply a matter of logical disagreement.
Rather, the differences in their communal sense and in their communal tastes necessitate that
they see this issue differently. They are a part of a different group with different preferences and
therefore see things differently. So different, that it is as if they are not dealing with the “same
thing.”
Concerning the character of disagreements between groups in relation to their sense of
community taste, Hannah Arendt in her Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy cites Cicero
observation, “I would rather be wrong with Plato than right with the Pythagoreans.”99 This
provocation demonstrates that people do not simply aim to be correct or to avoid being incorrect
in dealing with others, as if it does not matter who one is “with” or what community one desires
to be a part of. Conversely, the styles, attitudes, and preferences of the group with which one
identifies often matter more than whether their views are correct or not. Whom one identifies
with stylistically matters a great deal in one’s judgment of the truth and goodness of others. For
example, when one finds likable a politician who “tells it like it is,” a part of the attraction seems
to stem from the way they tell “it” at least as much as what they tell. The communities that
people believe embody truth and goodness are usually also found attractive, such that attraction
and repulsion (i.e. aesthetics) are related to judgments of truth and goodness.
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This relationship between tastes that produce affective discrimination and judgments of
truth and goodness is not incidental. As Arendt notes, “One judges always as a member of a
community, guided by one’s community sense, one’s sensus communis.”100 What is key here for
this project is that common sense is not a particular universal content that we all share, or even a
universal kinship that identically colors all of our seeing; instead a multiplicity of common
senses are enmeshed with our ways of judging and the particular judgments that we make. To
use Kantian parlance, sensus communis is not exhausted by sensus communis logicus, but also
includes sensus communis aestheticus.101 Communal sense, then, necessarily includes a sense of
communal taste–what attracts and repulses us, our inclinations and disinclinations, what we are
pleased and displeased by. In essence, that we all judge is given; how we judge is contingent.
Taking a multiplicity of communal senses as the present rhetorical context, a
deliberative-rationalistic paradigm is insufficient, at the very least because it does not adequately
take into account the aesthetic register of sensus communis. Specifically, I argue, the aspects of
communal character of common sense and its related aesthetic tastes and judgments are
underappreciated as a way for motivating others through discourse. Correspondingly then, there
must be something about far-right rhetoric’s ability to not only appeal to different groups’ senses
of and tastes from common sense, but also to cultivate and encourage certain preferences from
existing preferences.
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CHAPTER 3
APPRECIATING AFFECTIVE ARMOR: SKETCHING AN AESTHETIC
DIAGNOSTIC OF THE FAR RIGHT
In the previous chapter, I described rational-deliberative rhetoric as insufficient to contest
the far right. I also suggested that the aesthetic dimension of sensus communis, i.e. communal
taste and feelings, informs and contributes to the resilience of far-right politics against its
opposition. If far-right politics do not adhere to a rational-deliberative paradigm of understanding
and collective decision-making, and this paradigm is not effective in countering such politics,
then a different rhetorical approach should be taken.
Before sketching a rhetorical orientation that might better contest far-right politics, it is
important to appreciate why they are resilient. Therefore, it is necessary to sketch elements of the
aesthetic terrain of the far right in order to point toward what opposing the far right should entail
rhetorically. To imagine therapies that could address the ailment of authoritarian attitudes to
democratic politics, one needs a good diagnosis to inform the appropriate therapy. As the
previous chapter suggests, the predominant form of rational-deliberative rhetoric misunderstands
what it opposes. Adherents to this form of rhetoric tend to conceive of human beings as homo
economicus, which presumes that people are motivated by neutral and rational analysis of
evidence, and offer their corrective to far-right politics based on this view. In contrast, this
chapter offers a diagnosis of far-right politics based on Luc Ferry’s notion of homo aestheticus,
which conceives of human beings as significantly motivated by their communal tastes and
feelings.102
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From this interpretation of the character of human beings, I begin with a diagnosis of farright political rhetoric drawn from contemporary rhetorician Jenny Rice’s critique of “bullshit,”
in which she deepens understanding of the aesthetic motivations of the far-right. Her analysis
explains the problem of “hardened desire,” or dogmatic taste that lacks “porousness” toward
other viewpoints and that resists reflection and reconsideration of convictions. From the
symptomatic far-right preference for “bullshit,” I turn to Jeremy Engel’s genealogy of
resentment to provide a contextual basis for the hardened rhetorical desire of far-right politics.
One can see the cultivation of particular tastes in the rise of resentment-based politics. If far-right
aesthetic judgments have been cultivated over time, this suggests that it is possible to engender
different aesthetic inclinations, to reorient sensus communis toward democratic ethics. Such a
possibility is daunting to consider, given the tenacity of an established sensus communis in the
face of opposition.
To describe the difficult yet possible challenge of reorienting sensus communis
aestheticus, I examine Susan Sontag’s “Fascinating Fascism” to appreciate how such politics can
be attractive and their affective pull given the history of resentful politics. To amplify and extend
this analysis, I then consider Lawrence Grossberg’s dissection of the cultural dissatisfaction with
the present through his idea of affective landscapes. Cultural judgments about the nature of the
past, present, and future – and how they relate to each other as a trajectory – obscure other,
possibly better, futures. Finally, I stitch Kant’s distinction between determinant and reflective
judgment to Grossberg’s description of contemporary politics. I suggest that Kant’s aesthetic
vocabulary offers a means for an appropriate diagnosis of overdetermined judgments of
possibilities that are present. Such vocabulary also suggests cultivating a taste for reflective
political judgment as a therapeutic orientation to overdetermined judgment.
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Resilience of Bullshit: Appreciating Far-Right Hardened Desires
Faced with the disregard (rather than necessarily the disdain) for facticity animating farright rhetoric, it hard not to find that the disregard and its discourses are “bullshit.” If a paranoid
style characterizes far-right rhetoric, then bullshit is what it sounds like. It can be quite
frustrating to confront such discourse because of its “bulletproof” character; bullshit is immune
to conventional rhetorical tactics and rebuttals. As rhetorician Jenny Rice notes in her essay,
“Disgusting Bullshit,” “The bullshitter bullshits whether or not she actually believes something
to be the case.”103 This point is key in the confrontation with bullshit rhetoric. Too often, many
would-be opponents of far-right discourse act as if bullshitters may be swayed in their thinking–
that it is simply a matter of them being misinformed. Accordingly, this purportedly can be
rectified by “calling bullshit,” (pointing out the fallacious, inconsistent, or contradictory
character of the claim), which will ostensibly rob it of its rhetorical power. Once robbed of this
power, the bullshitter and her audience will “see the light” and, in good faith, change their
position. Chuck Todd surely acted on this premise when he sparred with Kellyanne Conway over
alternative facts.
Clearly, this is not the case that calling bullshit works. In fact, if this was the case, it
seems the world would have long ago been rid of the practice of bullshitting. If the mere naming
of bullshit stopped bullshit, then bullshiting probably would not occur. Bullshit persists even
when called out as such (and perhaps especially so!). Therefore, the continuous attempts of
pointing out the bullshit character of far-right claims appear as an insufficient, if not
counterproductive, strategy to confront this type of rhetoric. This leaves the question: given the
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negative consequences of bullshit, what can be done to effectively counter it, if merely “calling
bullshit” fails to deprive it of its power?
To provide an answer requires a better understanding of the character of bullshit, its aims,
and why it emerges in the first place. Rather than simply noting its counter-factual status, this
will help provide an account of the resilience of this phenomenon. To do so, I rely on Rice’s
definition, “Bullshit is a lack of concern for truth; bullshit is fakery for the purpose of achieving
some hidden motive.”104 There are at least two important points to this definition. First, the
“bullshitter” is not “playing the same game” as the person seeking truth in the rationaldeliberative sense. Their positions are not put forth in good faith in that they are not open to
modulation, revision, or transformation. Nor do they really listen to responses. By this, I mean
that the bullshitter does not take up what others have to say in such a way that the bullshitter may
be changed by the encounter. It does not matter what one says in response against, to appease, or
to provoke the bullshitter; if the aim is to move the bullshitter based on evidence and claims to
truth “head on” one almost certainly cannot succeed.
Second, bullshit is about power, not truth. Following a deliberative-rational paradigm to
rhetoric, many of us operate from the idea that truth, especially around notions of facticity, is
powerful or that power eventually goes to those who are truthful. This gives the sense that truth
will prevail and, in the end, emerge as powerful. Yet, a part of the disgust and revulsion toward
bullshit is that it works–it often achieves its end without regard for truth. Indeed, Rice notes,
“For the bullshitter, what matters is whether or not his or her goal is accomplished.”105
Therefore, the usual rhetorical strategies that concentrate on inconsistency, contradiction, and
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even conflict of interest are often ineffectual because these merely point out the character of
something expressed as bullshit. They presuppose that decrying its counter-factual status and/or
the negative aim it seeks can deprive bullshit of its potency. Again, following Rice’s
understanding, “calling bullshit” is usually insufficient at best because this does not hamper the
aim toward which bullshit is directed or lessen its indifference toward adhering to truths. Bullshit
is not really a result of misunderstanding or ignorance. Consequently, the intentional character of
bullshit is often underappreciated, yet necessary to understand and address this phenomenon.
To appreciate why people are drawn to bullshitting as a practice, we should consider the
powerful connection to sedimented desires, in place of reflection, as one of its key constitutive
aspects. Describing the rhetorical concerns versus the more “properly” philosophical descriptions
of bullshit, Rice writes, “As rhetoricians, what should concern us about bullshit’s blockages is
not so much the issue of truth . . . but the fact that any attempts to question, engage, or respond to
bullshit’s claims are obstructed by layer[s] of hardened desire.”106 Here is where the aesthetic
dimension of bullshit is apparent. Bullshit is resilient because it is attractive to its audiences.
Both the emergence of and the resort to bullshit are intimately related to desire–the more
intuitive, sentimental, and reactive aspects traditionally ascribed to human beings. Bullshit’s
formation from and intimate communication with desire accounts for its ambivalence toward,
rather than outright rejection of, truths in the rational-deliberative sense. As displayed from
common maxims about the irrational aspects of human beings such as “the heart wants what it
wants,” these demonstrate that the character and aims of desires are not determined calculated
analysis, but instead by seemingly automatic reaction.
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Nor are these desires monolithic. People seem to find themselves pulled toward different,
even contradictory ends. This is not inherently good or bad. Indeed, as Hofstadter’s observes,
while “the paranoid style has a greater affinity for bad causes than good . . . nothing really
prevents a sound program or demand from being advocated in the paranoid style.”107 Yet for this
project, when linked with far-right politics, a key problematic quality with the desire of bullshit
is that it is hardened; it is impermeable, reinforcing its unyielding character in the face of and
regardless of whatever response is provided.108 As Rice explains, “Countering bullshit . . . must
deploy a response that does not begin from the assumption of porousness.”109 Rice uses the
notion of rhetorical “blockage” or “build up” to describe impermeability, which may be
interpreted as a metaphor for obstacles preventing discourse in good faith, to argue that we
cannot presuppose bullshitters and those that “buy into it” are open to the possibility of being
moved. Therefore, if the aims of bullshit are to be avoided, confronted, or contested, the counterrhetoric to bullshit must be able to create a rhetorical porousness– it must open the way for
meaningful listening to occur–to “de-bullshit” rather than just calling bullshit. If this rhetoric is
to be contested, opponents of the far-right need to cultivate openness to reconsideration, or what
I call in the next chapter a “prejudice for reflective judgment.” Concisely, rhetorical projects
need to undo or dismantle rather than merely dismiss bullshit if they are to have a chance at
success.
This is no easy task. The hardened desire that makes bullshitting possible and its
reception often have many antecedents that cannot simply be undone. As I will suggest below
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following thinkers like Jeremy Engels, the festering of resentment will not be undone or
overcome (assuming it can be undone and that this is a desirable outcome) through clever
rebuttals or verbalization of sympathy. Admittedly, these may be necessary tactics to counter
bullshit. Yet, by recognizing the character of bullshit as a power maneuver rather than
rationalistic truth claim, its impermeability and its resistance to such efforts, and its foundation in
desire, we at least have a better sense of how to orient rhetorical projects aiming to contest
malignant forms of bullshit. Cultivating reflection and receptivity to others must be a common
aim of such projects.
The question of responding to neo-fascistic rhetoric, then, may come down to the
question of what works? What can break through, or weaken this hardened desire? Jenny Rice’s
account of deliberative rhetoric bouncing off of far-right bullshit is helpful in understanding the
contemporary rhetorical situation in the United States. The problem is that deliberative rhetoric
does not lessen recalcitrant desire; it does not make a mark or an impression upon either the
rhetors of bullshit or those impressed by them. Accordingly then, we need rhetorics that temper
desire, take hold, and persist; ones that make an impression upon those moved by bullshit. This
is difficult because such rhetoric is resilient— it resists everything else. In this case, encouraging
porousness requires a simultaneous acidity of an aesthetic orientation to weaken this type of
rhetoric and a creativity that can catch on that may emerge from the artistic aspects of aesthetics
to make an impression upon others.
At the basis of bullshit, then, are the aesthetics that inform its hardened desires. Rice
argues that aesthetic responses, “work to expose ways in which bullshit discourse is itself rooted
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in a sentimental aesthetics.”110 This is to say that the explicit aesthetic responses to bullshit (e.g.
disgust, revulsion, nausea) help illustrate the essential character of feelings and aesthetic
evaluations and preferences of the desires that constitute bullshit. Richard Spencer’s provocation
on the character of the so-called white race is an instance of this style of desire: “To be white is
to be a striver, a crusader, an explorer, and a conqueror. We build, we produce, we go upward . .
. For us it is conquer or die.”111 Here, the ideas of whiteness, authority, and dominance are key
objects of the desire. These also imply to repulsion against what is not white; fear of a diverse or
brown nation, and quasi-Christian values antithetical to science and democratic values. While a
view toward truth in a rationalistic sense leaves us puzzled as to the character of bullshit, let
alone how to successfully challenge it, an aesthetic orientation offers the chance to understand
these desires so that they might be reoriented toward porousness.112
If Rice is correct that, “Bullshit references nothing but its own sentiment,” then projects
that challenge bullshit need to work from, through, and with these sentiments as they are. A
110

Rice, “Disgusting Bullshit,” 471. Emphasis Added.
Grame Wood, “His Kampf,” Atlantic, June 2017.
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/06/his-kampf/524505/
112
Rice suggests disgust as a possible aesthetic antidote to the blockage of bullshit. In some
contexts, revulsion as an emotional response might unblock those susceptible to bullshit to listen
and consider other perspectives. Disgust could encourage others to become disgusted or prompt
shame that coincides with reevaluating worldviews and ways of being. If a style of politeness is
associated with weakness and not taken seriously, then disgust might provide a shock that can
challenge the resilience of bullshit. Disgust might weaken blockage and encourage porousness.
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rhetoric that can counter bullshit rhetoric ought to address the taste, inclinations, and ways of
evaluating, and desires of others to become more porous. Such openness could allow people to
consider different evaluations. Moreover, broadmindedness could become attractive as a way of
evaluating. Aesthetic strategies ought to encourage people to accept that not everything felt to be
true or good is so, without denying the truthfulness of what, how, and why it is felt (even if in
need of development). Indeed, with Rice, “We must create the conditions for which the call of
conscience can be heard.”113 Left-leaning opponents of the far right must create the conditions
for openness in addition to the specific democratic tastes, feelings, and desires that they hope to
communicate. Openness must be created, it cannot be presupposed. Therefore, they would
encourage democratic sentiments from a space of openness against the present closed and
authoritarian desires. We need to orient our sentiments toward being open to different sentiments
and sentimentality, so that even resentful, far-right citizens might feel the need to take up
democratic ethics. Moreover, they might feel ethics anew.
Historically Habituated Resentment and a Need for Democratic Aesthetic Imagination
If I have a book to have understanding in place of me, a spiritual adviser to have a
conscience for me, a doctor to judge my diet for me, and so on, I need not make any
efforts at all.114
In the preceding analysis of bullshit, I have argued from Rice that bullshit is motivated by
hardened desire and takes the form of a dogmatic rhetorical aesthetic. Bullshitters are resistant to
any convictions contrary to their own, which suggests that opponents of far-right “bullshit” need
to make hardened desire more porous to the views of others. To counter the rhetoric of far-right
113

Rice, “Disgusting Bullshit,” 471.
Kant, “An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment,'” in An Answer to the Question:
What is Enlightenment, trans. H. B. Nisbet, (London: Penguin Books, 2013), 1.

114

67

politics requires recreating the conditions whereby democratic ethics may be not only heard, but
also, necessarily, communicated. This requires more than aesthetic strategies; it requires a firm
grasp of the emotional, contextual basis that grounds the paranoid bullshit of far-right rhetoric. I
argue, following Jeremy Engels, that resentment can be understood as a key motivation for the
rhetorical “symptom” of bullshit. I draw on pertinent aspects of Engels’ genealogy of American
resentment in order to provide that context. With the understanding that resentment is the soil in
which paranoia grows and that bullshit fertilizes, I suggest that an atrophying democratic
imagination and a surging authoritarian imagination contribute to the resilience of far-right
politics.
An Interpretation of “Resentment”
Consider the evolution of “resentment.” Classical Greco-Roman and liberal notions of
democratic resentment saw it as the disempowered masses revolting against the ruling elite.
According to Engels, Richard Nixon crystalized a shift in the political nature of resentment in the
United States that divided the demos to the benefit of the elite. If democracy is always yet-tocome, i.e. a perpetual project that is worked toward, and there are injustices that need to be
addressed, then resentment is intertwined with necessarily imperfect democracy.115 This can be
vital; channeling the feeling of dissatisfaction at one’s place in the world in comparison to the
privileged is key to confronting and overcoming particular injustices. However, with Nixon’s
style of resentment, legitimate reasons for the demos to be resentful were reoriented toward
conflicts that split the demos into “the great silent majority” and the undemocratic and
unpatriotic minority (e.g. student protestors, civil rights activists, racial minorities etc.).
Accordingly, Engels writes, “[when] fractured into simple, simplistic, and all-too-easy binaries . .
115

See Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx, trans. Peggy Kamuf, (New York: Routledge, 2006).

68

. it [is] difficult to imagine ourselves as a demos acting collectively as a mighty agent of change
and justice.”116 This is to say that the paranoid style’s caricatures of its political opponents, or,
more precisely, enemies from such a view, have a long historical basis. Given a history of rigid
caricature, it is nearly impossible to communicate with each other about resolving (or at least
confronting) the causes of resentment. Communication even appears to be unnecessary;
convictions do not need to be reevaluated in conversation with others when one feels obligated to
choose between crude binaries—to stick with those in one’s own camp or defect.
Resentment seems to encourage calcification of convictions, the hardened desire of a
paranoid style. Inability or unwillingness to appreciate the political nuances of left-opposition
tends to reinforce far-right convictions and vice versa. Indeed, concerning resentment, Engels
writes, “As it is routinized, becoming over time civic habit, [such] politics cultivates an
orientation of resentment that encourages citizens to live reactive rather than active lives.”117 If
this is the case, the style of resentment exemplified by Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and Sarah Palin,
and exaggerated by Donald Trump is not endemic to democracy; rightwing culture has provided
a milieu in which such an orientation was possible and eventually has become actual.
Resentment as Habitual
However, the success of resentment politics makes it appear inevitable. Though
resentment is culturally acquired rather than inherent to human nature, its habitual status can
make it appear as intuitive, even natural and without alternatives. This is why it is resilient. If
one has been acculturated into a reactive stance, i.e. if resentment has become habitual, then this

116
117

Engels, The Politics of Resentment, 101-102, Emphasis Added.
Ibid, 130. Emphasis Added.

69

habit tends to cement itself. Merleau-Ponty in his Phenomenology of Perception offers a relevant
example. He argues:
It’s unlikely that I would in this moment destroy an inferiority complex in which I have
been complacent now for twenty years . . . this past, if not a destiny, has at least a specific
weight. . . Our freedom does not destroy [this] situation . . . so long as we are alive, our
situation is open…118
Like the person with a habitual inferiority complex, the cultural habit and resilience of
resentment mean that in any given moment, it is unlikely that resentment will be exchanged for
better democratic habits. That this tendency has been cultivated over decades means that it will
be difficult to challenge. When resentment feels intuitive for many, it is unlikely, though still
possible, that other feelings will be taken up. By being politically and culturally habitual, though
it tends to perpetuate itself, these existing habits are still open to different habits. While
resentment is resilient, it is not invincible. Habits can become otherwise. It is from this
possibility that one can imagine rhetorical means for disrupting the civic habit of resentment and
reorienting it and/or cultivating new habits.
The tendency toward resentment reinforcing itself, thus, is a tendency and not an
inevitability. This difference makes all the difference. It is the difference between the unlikely (or
less likely) and the impossible. If we can disrupt the habituation of this civic habit and develop
other habits, if we can encourage more active ways of being together, if we can cultivate
prejudices for reflective judgment upon the particular happenings rather than subsume them
under our previous conceptions, then we might be able to live more active lives. We might be
able to re-orient resentment toward cathartic action that addresses the roots of resentment instead
118
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of toward scapegoating others that perpetuates this feeling of dissatisfaction. We might be able to
construct new forms of common sense; how we live in common with others, are attracted and
repulsed by particular happenings, and our capability of being affected.
Even if one is unconvinced by Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological description of habits
as resilient yet open, the historical record demonstrates the potential to challenge resentment.
Ironically, that Nixon crystalized the political habit of e pluribus duo displays the potential for
new habits. This form of resentment was not always present. Political desire has not always
manifested this way. The demos can change because it has changed. Though detrimental,
nonetheless, there was a novelty about this style; certain attitudes were cultivated and adopted
while others were discouraged and neglected. The possibility of novelty displays that the present
style of resentment may also be discouraged and different attitudes may be encouraged.
Therefore, what are the conditions for the possibility of challenging the habitual taste for
resentment? How can democratic political tastes and habits become attractive to those
sympathetic to the far right?
A problem of habitual resentment is that if such a reactive stance is habitual, and there
are limited spaces that encourage the creativity, imagination, and experimentation to consider
and take up different convictions, then this habit tends to cement itself. In other words, many
political, social, and cultural happenings reinforce the habitual blockages in peoples’ ways of
seeing and acting. For example, the Las Vegas shooting of audience members at an outdoor
merely concert sustained or reinforced many people’s convictions about the regulation of
firearms in the United States.
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Atrophy of the Democratic Imagination
Nixon’s shift to resentment in the form of e pluribus duo signals the habitual atrophy of
the democratic imagination. There is no need to meaningfully imagine others because many
believe they already know all they need to about others. Thus, there is no great need or value in
understanding others. If there is little need to exercise a democratic imagination toward the Other
because of the predominance of predigested caricatures of Otherness, then this tends to confirm
prejudices, particular judgments toward difference and an overdetermined way of judging
differences. Relatedly, because many who are possessed by resentment do not feel the need to
broaden their views beyond their present ones, they seem to be rarely reflective in rendering
judgment and instead merely apply what they already believe irrespective of particular situations.
For example, the tragedies of inadequate action concerning the Flint water crisis or of Hurricane
Maria are, at best, only marginally taken up in the course of judging. Instead, far-right rhetoric
tends merely to apply pre-existing convictions, such as the imperative to restrain “big
government” with austerity, to the given situation. The conditions are irrelevant to the desire.
Indeed, such pre-judgment determines judgment.119
Therefore, members of the far right often overlook the living, material, and particular
happenings of a given situation in favor of untethered, determinate, and “sedimented” truisms.
This sedimentation is vicious; all happenings tend (and are all-but determined) to confirm and
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reinforce our way of seeing the world. The calcification of judgment employs the imagination
only to re-produce an image of the given issue in line with previous judgments, rather than make
present or create an image that can put into question and challenge pre-judgments to broaden and
sharpen feelings and understandings of political and cultural issues.
Accordingly, one of the casualties of a habitually atrophied democratic imagination is the
inability (and unwillingness?) to conjure up more distant and desirable possibilities. Under such
conditions only the more limited possibilities present themselves to be actualized. This is
because an emaciated imagination is more limited in what may it may envision and instead tends
toward anemic, degraded repetition. When the demos finds itself under conditions that prompt
resentment, such visual and affective stagnation of what could be only serve to maintain or
intensify resentment to the point of reactionary outbursts. Rather than producing a long-awaited
qualitative change to finally tackle the causes of resentful dissatisfaction (e.g. structural sexism,
racism, and classicism), the tendency is toward maintaining and exacerbating these tensions.
Relatedly, Engels writes that in contemporary rhetoric of resentment, “people [do] not act as
much as react.”120 An atrophy of the imagination, or, the preponderance of the re-creative
imagination over the creative imagination tends to produce shortsighted responses. Though the
demos’ intuition prompts resentment because of its distaste for its place in society, it cannot
conjure, let alone actualize, imaginative enough alternatives to set in motion a future different
than the present. Or, at minimum, a resentful imagination cannot spark action adequate to
address the roots of resentment. Rather, the present is merely negated without creating positive
alternatives. Engels continues; “Citizens find it difficult to even imagine the transformative
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power of democratic fraternity.”121 If democratic imagination has atrophied, i.e. our collective
ability to make present and be open to new and preferable possibilities, then this only aids the
perpetuations of our habitual resentment in its current form. A difficult paradox then arises; for
the hope of democratic fraternity to be actualized, its potential must be imagined to excite us to
this possibility and make it be desirable. Yet, to excite the imagination, there must already be the
latent creativity that can allow for the chance of us imagining this possibility. Such a possibility
may appear as unavailable because this democratic fraternity is not active in our memory, is not
presently occurring, and is not foretold as likely to occur or worth occurring in the future.
Therefore, displays or images of a possible democratic fraternity are needed to prompt
the imagination to understand this possibility as possible and desirable, i.e. achievable and worth
working for. At least two questions emerge: how can the imagination be excited to encourage
attempts at democratic fraternity at smaller and larger scales before it is actualized, especially
when the habit of resentment has become so cemented? Relatedly, what activities that “forecast”
democratic fraternity can be “magnified” to excite the imagining of this possibility, and to excite
the desire to incite action from and toward democratic fraternity? While not claiming to provide
any definitive answers to these questions, I do think the importance of the imaginative aspects of
projects are important in seeking to disrupt current incarnations of resentment and cultivate new
ways of being together democratically.
To review, we can and should critique the politics of resentment that motivate the
rhetoric of e pluribus duo. Nonetheless, there is hope in the possibility of changing habits and far
right’s success because they demonstrate the ability to shape and modify rhetorical taste that
differs from the status quo of an ascendant far right. Even if we do not know beforehand what
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such a world precisely will look like, such a move is possible and seems necessary if there is to
be hope in realizing a better world. Cultivating an aesthetic orientation toward democratic ethics
and ends, one that feeds a desire for flexibility and not dogmatism, might be the right response to
the hardened desire that motivates far-right political rhetoric.
“Fascinating Fascism”: Aesthetic Appeal as “Non-Politically” Political
From Engel’s understanding of the historical and habitual resentment and an atrophy of
the democratic imagination from Engels, I turn to the attractiveness of this habit by revisiting
Susan Sontag’s “Fascinating Fascism.”122 Sontag offers an understanding of the staying power of
resentment. By arguing that (neo)fascist longings are still felt, its resilience can be better
understood. Resilience from (neo)fascist longings are difficult to communicate with for those
hoping to contest their corresponding politics, especially when challenging the intuitive taste for
and feeling of attraction for resentment. While Rice describes the challenge presented by resilient
far-right bullshit, and Engels describes the strength of the historical and habituated character of
far-right resentment, Sontag identifies and analyzes an even more profoundly difficult challenge
to democracy from the far-right’s aesthetic longings. Such longings "charge” the far right; they
not only immunize them against epistemic challenges, nor just inoculate them against
deliberative politics, but also reflect dogmatic tastes that feel self-evident. Democratic projects
face the difficult yet necessary task of undermining these tastes and feelings. Appreciating the
depth of these tastes and feelings and their interrelation to the politics of resentment further
develops the diagnosis of the far-right by looking at their aesthetic inclinations. I suggest that the
aesthetics of traditional fascism of the 1920s-40s is echoed in the seemingly “cooler” neofascism of the present.
122

Susan Sontag, “Fascinating Fascism,” New York York Review of Books, February 6, 1975.

75

In “Fascinating Fascism,” Sontag reviews Leni Riefenstahl’s film The Last of Nuba, the
“air-brushing” of fascist aesthetics and their continued appeal. Sontag displays through discourse
analysis the “rehabilitation” of Riefenstahl through the ostensible divorce of the aesthetic and the
political and the growing appeal of her style a mere 30 years after the end of the second world
war. This is similar to the rehabilitation and habituation of far-right politics in the present. By
analyzing key moments in Sontag’s text, we can find insights into the continued relevance of the
appeal of, taste for, and attractiveness of resentful and potentially fascistic habits. This can
highlight the uncomfortable interrelatedness between the attraction to such aesthetics and (latent)
taste for these politics. Perhaps the uncomfortable truth is that if we are to contest neo-fascistic
politics, we must acknowledge their aesthetic appeal (even for those against such politics).
Further, rhetorical programs that contest such politics may need to operate on the level of taste;
they need to appreciate the taste for far-right politics if they are to cultivate distaste for these
aesthetics and tastes for democratic ethical alternatives.
To begin, we may turn to an interview with Riefenstahl on her most famous works,
Triumph of the Will and Olympiad. In a line eerily similar to Trump’s infamous Access
Hollywood recording, Sontag quotes Riefenstahl’s interview, “I can simply say that I feel
spontaneously attracted by everything that is beautiful . . . I am fascinated by what is beautiful,
strong, healthy, what is living.”123 Here, we may get the sense that Riefenstahl is simply
concerned with aesthetic, not political matters. She purports to be only attracted to beautiful
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forms. This seemingly grants her innocence from the ethical and political muddiness (to put it
mildly) of the content of her work.
Yet, the aesthetic appeal of her work and its political-ethical ramifications are more
related than Riefenstahl claims. We can see this from within this very statement responding to
the “German concern for form.” That her aesthetic fascination is with the “strong”, “healthy,”
“what is living,” “harmony,” and makes her happy implies an ethical evaluation of the content,
rather than an exclusively aesthetic evaluation concerning form. The qualities of being strong,
healthy, living, harmonious, and happy are not solely aesthetic; to call something strong, healthy,
living etc. is also to call something excellent which has ramifications for ethics and politics. In
other words, Riefenstahl deeply associates, if not conflates, what she finds beautiful with what
she finds to be good. To use a contemporary example, calling a southern border wall “beautiful”
displays the connection between aesthetic judgments and the attraction to a politics of
resentment. All of these traits are simultaneously aesthetically and ethically appealing.
By tying aesthetic evaluation to resentful politics, affective fascination is a part of the
staying power of neo-fascistic rhetorical habits. The power of resentful politics seems to stem
from its affective charge; its ability to appeal to and to shift tastes. Therefore, being fascinated by
resentful politics, one is simultaneously making an ethical evaluation; aesthetic judgments
inform one’s ethical stance at least as much as ethical evaluations inform aesthetic judgments. As
difficult as conflicts of ethics are, contesting seemingly self-evident and intuitive feelings is a
difficult proposition. Moreover, when these attitudes have “contempt for all that is reflective,
critical, and pluralistic,” or as Andrew Bokhari and Milo Yiannopoulous describe as “a
preference for homogeneity over diversity, for stability over change, and for hierarchy and
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order,” then these attitudes are de facto uncontested.124 Even if these attitudes are conventionally
contested, the very feelings are armored against the possibility of feeling differently. Thus, their
viciousness is twofold–not only in their specific content, (e.g. taste for unquestioned authority
and obedience and disgust with diversity), but also its violence in principle to alternative
sentiments as such.
A part of this armoring arises from the belief in the self-evident and unchallengeable
character of feelings. Concerning Riefenstahl’s rehabilitation, (which I link to the rehabilitation
of far-right rhetoric), Sontag writes, “A [strong] reason for the change in attitude toward
Riefenstahl lies in a shift in taste which makes it impossible to reject art if it is ‘beautiful.’”125
Here, Sontag is describing the growing sentiment that, if art (and affect) is understood as a purely
aesthetic phenomenon, that we may then only judge it aesthetically. Put differently, if the work
seems only concerned with form (rather than form and content), then one may only judge it
based on its ability to produce formal appeals irrespective of content. This understanding did not
spontaneously arise; the Western aesthetic tradition often separates the aesthetic from the ethical
and political spheres. Walter Benjamin is famous for equating aesthetic politics with the danger
of fascism in his “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.”126 From the rise of
such an attitude, critiques of the tastes and sentiments of resentful politics are impossible; merely
“authentically” feeling something establishes its truth.
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Accordingly, as Sontag writes, “Riefenstahl’s films are still effective because . . . their
longings are still felt.”127 These feelings react against what Goebbels describes as the tendency of
“putting the head over the heart, the individual over the community, [and] intellect over
feeling.”128 As displayed by the growth of neo-fascist rhetoric and sentiment, our culture
maintains the conditions for the possibility of far-right politics; we are still inclined toward,
enchanted by, and fascinated with this viciousness. Truly, many are still moved by these ways of
being.
Consequently, one of the differences between this cultural-political moment and the one
Sontag discusses is that while she was working against the failure “to detect the fascist longings
in our midst,” we are combatting the failure to contest the materialization of neo-fascism in our
political institutions. What were (more or less) latent fascist tendencies have become manifest
neo-fascistic rhetoric and practices. The place and relation of taste and aesthetics can no longer
be ignored if we are to address one of the roots that allow for and make actual these practices.
Affective Landscapes: Temporal Dissatisfaction and Kant’s Modes of Judgment
An Interpretation of “Affective Landscapes.”
It is one thing to understand the depth of feeling in far-right paranoia’s resentful bullshit
and that it is a habituated, historical form of rhetoric that can change. It is another to
conceptualize how such feelings can and do change. I consider Lawrence Grossberg’s notion of
affective landscapes for a social and cultural perspective on this phenomenon. The metaphor of
affective landscapes offer a helpful account for diagnosing the motivations of far-right politics in
that changing ‘landscapes’ suggests potential rhetorical therapies that adequately appreciate the
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social character of aesthetic cultivation. Then, I stitch his observation of a popular belief in the
impossibility and unnecessary character of judgment in the public consciousness to suggest a
turn to Kant’s aesthetic vocabulary. Kant’s differentiation between determinant and reflective
judgment offers a fitting description of the different ways people judge politically. I use this
vocabulary to provide a diagnosis of (over)determinant judgment within the far right and suggest
a corrective or therapy through cultivating a prejudice toward habit of reflective judgment.
Affective landscapes offer a more nuanced understanding of the challenge of contesting
far-right affective politics. Grossberg describes an affective landscapes as, “a complex social
way of being in the world, a densely textured space within which some experiences, behaviors,
choices, and emotions are possible, some ‘feel’ inevitable and obvious, and still others are
impossible or unimaginable.”129 He likens affective landscapes to a fog or atmosphere that
permeates not only the situations we passively experience, but also “its active conditions and
expressions.”130 I understand this to denote the common and shared sentiments and attitudes that
“one” (Heidegger’s das Man) feels; the terrain of sentiments and perceptions that inform
peoples’ practices and comportment to the world.
The social sentiments and perceptions of affective landscapes can be applied to make
sense of the far right. Similar to how Engel’s genealogy displays Nixonian resentful politics are
historical rather than ontologically or naturally endemic to democracy, I understand these politics
as social and cultural phenomena rather than only individualistic. To see resentment as derived
from a social milieu better accounts for the character of this political phenomenon; it appreciates
an intersubjective influence in motivating political convictions. Indeed, Grossberg describes
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affective landscapes as “a key element in any calculation about how to change the [cultural and
political] story.”131 We need to grasp where we are to better imagine where we can and should
be. Such imaginings can inform the political actions that are taken. If affect arises from
intersubjective landscapes, then the aim of countering far-right rhetoric should target the social
and cultural aspects of feeling, rather than the specific feelings of individuals on the hope of
simply persuading enough individuals to abandon the far right.
Temporal Dissatisfaction
Resonating with Engels’ description of contemporary politics of resentment, Grossberg
understands the emerging affective landscape in the United States to be “an organization of
passive nihilism.”132 He maps four predominant strands: affective autonomy, anxiety and
hyperactivism, sociality as personalization (narcissism), and temporal alienation.133 For this
section, I briefly review affective autonomy and focus on temporal alienation. The affective
autonomy links well with the previous chapter’s description of sensus communis aestheticus.
Grossberg asserts, “people are increasingly aware of the contradictions that define their common
sense, and they have learned to live comfortably with them.”134 As argued in the previous
chapter, simply revealing the unknown facts or inconsistencies within people’s worldviews
cannot change those views. At least to a certain degree, the contradictions do not matter. They
are sustained through commitments to particular forms of common sense, the sensus communis
that is essential to selfhood. To alter or abandon aesthetic common sense, even if understood as
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inconsistent or self-contradictory, is to alter and abandon one’s current way of being–to become
a “new” person.
Therefore, it is necessary to dis-ease habitual resentment. Here, understanding the feature
of temporal alienation in the present affective landscape advances my diagnosis of the resilience
of the far right. A part of this dis-easing of common sense should disrupt senses of temporality.
This is to say our understanding and how we act on what we believe/feel about time is coconstitutive of sensus communis. Grossberg concisely describes our attitude toward time: “It is
as if it is always too soon too late; there is no present that can be the right time.”135 Indeed, this
echoes the famous proclamation in Hamlet that is of particular interest to Derrida, “Time is out
of joint.” Part of the fuel feeding a vicious resentment derives from a collective feeling of the
exhaustion of the past, dissatisfaction with the present, and futility of the future. Many on the
right seem to imagine the past as spent, the present as more-or-less static, and the future as the
mere continuation of what already is and has been. No present or series of presents can amount
to a future, or something worth traveling toward. To use Ernst Bloch’s phrase, there is within farright rhetoric an underappreciation of the “not-yet”–the possibilities in the present that are
informed by memories of the past to imagine and actualize (un)certain futures.
A greater appreciation of the not-yet seems to be precisely what is needed if we are to
orient a public common sense toward better possibilities; to “lean into” a re-enchanted present
that can give birth to qualitatively different futures. To feel the power and promise of possibility–
to understand that not-yet as potentially yet-to-be so that it can become actual. Contrary to the
current temporal alienation, it seems our affective landscape, our sensus communis, should
appreciate and remember the past, so that the future is more open, hopeful, and can be
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qualitatively different. We need to feel that the present is dynamic, that it is a rich enough place
for individuals to learn from the past and to work on projects for a better and more democratic
future. This “pragmatic utopian” orientation does not purport to work toward an ever-receding
future, though success is never certain. Instead, the aim is to imagine workable moments in the
present that can produce better futures. To do so will require an aesthetic orientation to the
present that is hopeful and reflective and not resentful and calcified.
A Reconsideration of Kantian Aesthetic Vocabulary for Contemporary Politics
As demonstrated in the first chapter, the rhetorical boundaries between feelings or
sentiments and truth are becoming less distinct. Grossberg addresses this condition as it relates to
the phenomenon of “fake news,” providing a link between the contemporary moment and Kant’s
aesthetic vocabulary about determinant and reflective ways of judging. Grossberg writes, “Truth
itself is becoming a matter of affect! The problem with fake news is not simply that it denies
Truth, or even that it denies the possibility of judgment, but that it denies the necessity of
judgment, the link between judgment and credibility.”136 There is a sense that our feelings are
self-evidently correct, are the very ground where truth is. If sentiment is self-referential, meaning
that there are no underlying or contributing factors to its existence, then it appears as intuitively
right. When this intuition contributes to authoritarian politics, it seems that reflection upon this
intuition is needed to potentially revise such feelings. From a belief in feelings as self-evident,
there is no possible judgment “underneath” or within taste, feeling, or affect. Therefore, there is
no credible or meaningful possibility of reflective judgment upon our feelings–they are the
beginning, middle, and end of the truth.
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Resentful civic habits, tastes, and feelings are made possible, maintained, and reinforced
through the (over-) exercise of what Kant calls determinant judgment–the way of judging that
merely applies its universal premise regardless of the particular context.137 Using the Las Vegas
shooting as an example again, a determinant judgment about the shooting would take one’s prejudgment, (e.g. that, in general, assault weapons should or should not be banned), and apply that
thinking to this particular situation. This would mean that proponents or opponents of an assault
weapon ban would see this situation as an example proving that they have been and are already
“right” about this issue.
Admittedly, determinant judgment is a necessary way of judging for some contexts. We
cannot “reinvent the wheel” of society at every moment and live a healthily ordered life. Some
determinant judgment is required politically; not every single political situation can be decided
“from scratch.” Nevertheless, with the rise of a paranoid style and its accompanying calcified
convictions that threaten healthy democratic discourse, one must challenge this calcification to
resist the rise of authoritarian politics. Civic habits discourage meaningful habits of reflection, as
everything we already believe is merely confirmed.
If there is any hope of challenging these calcified convictions, I argue in the next chapter
that a more reflective way of judging needs to be cultivated and taken up. Following Kant, a
reflective way of judging primarily engages the particular; the particular is not merely subsumed
underneath a pre-given universal conviction.138 One’s general convictions are suspended or
bracketed in reflective judgment; universal sentiments do not dictate how one feels about a given
situation or happening. Moreover, using Rice’s language, reflective judgments require the
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“porousness” to particular experiences so as to reconsider one’s general sentiments and
convictions. In other words, this way of judging allows for particulars to “have their say” in
general convictions.
Letting particulars have their say through reflective judgment opens the possibility for
tastes to change. Through reflective judgment, there is a chance for one’s feelings about a
particular situation and one’s related general convictions to come into conflict. If the particular
situation is taken seriously enough, this opening can prompt a reassessment of one’s general
conviction. Reflective openings can change one’s general sentiments; appreciating the richness
of particulars can dissolve hardened desires. Admittedly, there is no guarantee that a reflective
way of judging will change general convictions. Upon reassessing a general conviction, one may
reaffirm one’s preexisting conviction. Nevertheless, encouraging reflective judgment in taste,
feelings, and conviction seems to offer a better chance of addressing the resilience of far-right
politics. Recalling Rice, this is because practicing reflective judging tries to encourage and create
the conditions for openness, rather than merely presupposing it.139
In the case of the Las Vegas shooting example, a reflective way of judging would not
allow one’s preformed general conviction, (e.g. that, in general, assault weapons should or
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should not be banned), to dictate their sentiments and perception of this particular situation.
One’s general stance on the desirability of regulating firearms would be open to input from the
tragic character of what occurred in Las Vegas. This would mean that proponents or opponents
of an assault weapon ban would not only see this situation as an example to subsume underneath
their general conviction; they might come to see they have been “wrong” about this issue. This
space provides the chance that they will feel differently about the regulation of firearms in this
particular instance than they generally do. Such cleavage between feelings about gun control for
the particular happening of the Las Vegas shooting (e.g. that laissez-faire gun laws contributed to
this tragedy) and in general (e.g. that laissez-faire gun laws generally do not contribute to gun
violence) can allow for the general conviction to change.
With resentful and paranoid politics, then, it seems there is no habit or desire to
reflectively judge, no lamenting of the “loss” of this potentially critical faculty, For those hoping
to challenge, reorient, or put into question resentful feelings and authoritarian tastes, it seems the
only course is to take up the difficult but necessary task of cultivating reflective habits in how
people’s tastes and judgments.
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CHAPTER 4
CULTIVATING A PREJUDICE FOR REFLECTIVE JUDGMENT:
IMAGINING AN AESTHETIC ORIENTATION TO RHETORIC
TO CONTEST THE FAR RIGHT
The preceding chapters provide a better sense of why far-right rhetoric appears resilient
against a predominant strain of rationalist-deliberative rhetoric, and also of the attractiveness of
far-right, reactionary resentment. Because of this, it is unwise to keep adhering to a rationaldeliberative style of rhetoric in response to the far right and expect different or better results.
Lawrence Grossberg describes this need for novelty by writing, “We need to offer something
other than the stories we have been telling for decades, which have, in case you have not noticed,
largely failed.”140 If this is the case, the place of the imagination, creativity, and reflective
thinking seem to be essential to offer new narratives to confront, counter, and hopefully improve
our political, economic, and socio-cultural practices. To conjure up new stories, new affective
landscapes, new directions for sensus communis aestheticus, I argue an aesthetic openness must
be present. New stories need to be listened to if they really are to be taken up. Sedimented tastes,
desires, and feelings need to be weakened if new ones are to be considered. This is to say that
flexibility and willingness to consider what is at least initially distasteful, undesirable, and
uncomfortable is indispensable for novelty.
Therefore, I argue for cultivating a prejudice for reflective judgment to encourage
aesthetic porousness. The openness that comes with reflection would challenge the
overdetermined, closed judgment of the far right. To do so, I explain the need for reflective
judgment to be a cultural prejudice (“pre-judgment”), habit, or general attitude. Paradoxically,
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for reflective judgment to have some staying power, especially against overdetermined
judgment, it requires a determinant judgment that understands the meaningful consideration of
particular experiences to be necessary and desirable. Then, I imagine a theoretical approach to
cultivating this habit of judgment through “rich particulars,” i.e. happenings that resist being
subsumed by overdetermination and that “lend themselves” to reflective judging, exemplars that
encourage reflective judgment as a way of judging, and shaping what I call the “feeling of
feeling” to reorient people’s more immediate and intuitive sentiments through their judgment
about the initial feeling.
Before sketching some key aspects of such an orientation, it is worthwhile to take a
moment to understand the weight of the contemporary situation; specifically, the potential
withering away of the very creative aspects of culture that offer the chance for something
different to emerge. Grossberg presents this scenario: “How do we imagine the present as a field
of actualities and possibilities? What if it is the imagination itself that is in jeopardy?
Imagination dead; imagine. Is this the fascism of our age!”141 Imagining this unimaginable, yet
possible future is profoundly disturbing. The vitality and vital character of the imagination is
difficult to overstate. As I discuss below, the imagination is essential to meaningful reflection
and therefore to the manifestation of different stories and worlds. It is key to the recognition of
what is, is not-yet, and perhaps even what is yet-to-be. Imagining the death of the democratic
imagination is frightening because it relies upon the very faculty it foretells as dead to bring forth
this image. We are prompted to envision a world that could no longer be envisioned if it came to
be. Irrespective of the possibility of such an occurrence, I hope to work against this image by
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advocating for an aesthetic orientation to rhetoric that cultivates a prejudice for reflective
judgment.
Reflective Judgment as a Form of Porousness
The key, I believe, to an aesthetic orientation to rhetoric that could contest the far right is
what I describe as a cultivation of a prejudice for reflective judgment. This style of judgment,
when brought to bear in the face of new or different particular experiences, can decalcify
overdetermined and instantaneous, or “knee-jerk,” ways of judging. Such decalcification would
replace, or encourage reflection on, judgments that are common sensical to present tastes, in
these of being seemingly obvious or self-evident.
Reflection here is not sought as an end in itself. Rather, reflection is sought as a means
for making judgments, more precisely for reflective judging, in the practical sphere of decisionmaking. Such a mode of judging would not necessarily reject one’s initial judgments or
prejudices (pre-judgments). It will also not guarantee a “correct” decision after a period of
reflection. Even if truly open to the particularity of the context, reflection is still not a recipe to
“get it right.” While reflection cannot produce perfect judgment, this way of judging can allow
for better judgment because it respects the importance of particulars for informing ethical,
aesthetic and epistemic phenomena. Even in the case when reflective judging confirms our
prejudgments, this way of judging better guards us against confirmation bias by allowing us to
more thoroughly consider diverse, even contradictory sentiments and convictions.
Given this, reflection, or more specifically a way of judging that delays final judgment
until after consideration of the particular context, can produce more nuanced or rich judgments.
To contest the habituated, calcified rhetorical taste of far-right politics, the case for a more
reflective form of judging is that democracy is only healthy when other tastes, ideas, and
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practices can prompt changes in the perception and sentiments of a people. By not challenging
the hardened convictions of the far right “head on,” but instead by targeting the firmness of felt
conviction itself, the cultivation of a more reflection regarding the significance of events in
political rhetoric has the potential to restore some measure of democratic discourse. For example,
after the Las Vegas shooting, country artists Josh Abbott and Caleb Keeter expressed a reversal
of their feelings and position on gun control.142 In a twitter post, Keeter writes, “I’ve been a
proponent of the 2nd amendment my entire life. Until the events of last night. I cannot express
how wrong I was. We actually have members of our crew with [Concealed Handgun Licenses],
and legal firearms on the bus . . . They were useless.”143 Here, Keeter describes his general
feelings on gun control changing because of this particular happening. In other words, the
visceral quality of this event appears to compel Keeter to reassess and ultimately change his view
on this issue. Yet, it seems fair to say that if Keeter were not on the scene of this tragedy, that his
position on this issue would be less likely to change. That is, if he had not experienced this
shooting “first-hand,” his relationship to this the general policy position would probably remain
the same. This is because he has tended to oppose gun regulations his “entire life.”
Because of this claimed life-long habit, it took experiencing an extraordinary event firsthand (which unfortunately seems to have become increasingly ordinary) to prompt reflection on
his previous position to ultimately change it. Accordingly, reflective judgment need not take an
onerous period of time, spanning months, years, or decades before a decision is made and action
is taken. Instead, following Kant, it refers to the form of judging that works from or starts with
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the particulars (e.g. the Las Vegas shooting) and works toward universals, decision, and action
(e.g. general stance on gun control). A Kantian notion of determinant judgment that would start
with, for example, a pre-determined stance on gun control policy, and then just apply it to the
how to feel about the Las Vegas shooting. But as seen in this instance of reflective judgment,
judging can be “instantaneous” though still reflective. Because reflection can be intuitive, it is
important to develop said reflection as kind of habit.
Reflective Judgment as a Aesthetico-Political Prejudice and Habit
Some might object to the prejudicial character of reflective judgment that I am
advancing. They may argue that if reflection, which appears to be contrary to the overdetermined
or “reflex-like” way of judging, is to be made a prejudice that it could not be authentically
reflective. This is to say that one might object that authentic reflection requires an absence of
prejudicial judgment. Everyone and everything would need to be open to reevaluation to be truly
reflective.
Further, it may be raised as an objection that by being prejudicial, a cultivated prejudice
for reflective judgment would undermine its call for reflection by ceding ground to a particular
form of prejudice, thus being “self-contradictory.” Even if a prejudice or habit for reflective
judgment purports to work against calcified tastes, feelings, and sentiments, by encouraging a
habitual or non-reflective tendency for reflection, it is doomed to fail because such a prejudice is
at war with itself. It will not ultimately undermine habitual ways of judging because it still relies
upon habit to prompt and maintain reflective judgment.
While these objections observe a logic of consistency, they underestimate the importance
of habits, unreflective practices, or “rules of thumb” in producing sustained modes of human
behavior. Additionally, the pre-givenness of sensus communis necessarily provides an orientation
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for the rhythms and routines. We cannot be without sensus communis, meaning socio-cultural
thumbnails or inclinations. Because of this, there is no possibility of a space outside of some
prejudices or, in common parlance, of “no judgment.” There are tendencies toward what we are
open to and closed off from, to what attracts and repels us. Consequently, rather than taking on
the dubious task of trying to rid people of all prejudices, cultivating better prejudices seems to be
more feasible. A prejudice toward reflective judgment would have the advantage of being
habitually intuitive while being open to different tastes and sentiments. Put differently,
inculcating a communal taste for reflection would mean that one would socially inherit or
develop it as a predisposition. A part of the reason for the staying power of far-right convictions
seems to be its prejudicial character. Perhaps ironically then, shifting the power of prejudice
toward reflection could cultivate this practice toward more democratic ends. From a prejudice for
reflective judgment, the only thing “overdetermined” is that one can be confident only after
consideration of particulars, yet never certain to the point of fundamentalism.
Particulars to Principles: Imagining the Cultivation of Habits for Reflective Judgment
How could such a prejudice for reflective judgment be cultivated? With the concept of a
prejudice for reflective judgment in mind, it is necessary to seek the conditions for the possibility
of cultivating such a prejudice so that it may be better understood how to go about encouraging
its growth. If particular kinds of judgments and actions of the far right are deemed socially
unethical, not to mention dangerous, by democratic standards and if these judgments are difficult
to change due to the unreflective stance that supports making them, then it seems necessary to
understand how one might encourage a counter-prejudice, reflective judgment that could
ultimately supports an open culture of judgment embracing diverse tastes. Again, because
reflective judgment need not occur over an extended period of time, it can and should apply
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equally to epiphanies and to more gradual changes. In both cases, the change in the way of
judging is key, in the movement from particulars to principles rather than the other way around.
Accordingly, any given particular, like the Las Vegas shooting, should trigger reflective
judgment rather than rote conviction. Here, Keeter's remarks are instructive; he experienced firsthand the “useless[ness]” of the legal firearms available in deterring and responding to the massshooting. Recalling his change of heart, the massacre could not be reconciled with his life-long
view, so he felt compelled to change his position. It is important to note here the power of the
human ability to reconcile most happenings with already established feelings about almost
anyone or anything in the world. This is to say that it is often more comfortable to find ways to
maintain present tastes and ways of being than to change them in the face of contradictions.
From the strength of the human faculty to maintain beliefs against change, we can gather that the
character of this particular happening was powerful enough to challenge Keeter’s general
feelings toward and conception of this issue. Moreover, it was powerful enough to overcome any
propensity to rationalize or subsume most particular happenings underneath his general feelings.
Why? When all other efforts, arguments, and conventional discourse had failed to prompt a
reconsideration, let alone persuasion, what was different about this situation that made change
possible?
To answer this, Abbott’s remarks on Twitter are helpful. He writes on twitter, “I’ll never
unhear those gunshots; and our band and crew will never forget how that moment made them
feel. Our hearts are with all the victims.”144 In this post, Abbott does not refer to lofty principles
that are cognitively deduced to come to a conclusion on what his attitude should be–he hears and
feels the suffering of others. Colloquially, his heart rather than his head motivates his judgment.
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Feeling drives change. The direct experiencing of this event provides an image that is moving.
This reorients his relation to this issue. Abbott’s memory, made possible through the imagination
of the past, attempts to (re)create this image so that it can be communicated with others who
have not directly experienced the shooting. Still, in being communicated, this recreation can
never be, nor would we want it to be, a literal representation of the event as it occurred for
Abbott. We have no choice but to get this “second-hand” from Abbott’s account.
Consequently, while it is moving that Abbott and Keeter have seemed to genuinely
reflect on this situation from within the situation, the first-hand experiencing of violence to alter
attitudes would be difficult to, not to mention undesirable to, “scale up.” More generally, we
cannot exclusively rely upon weighty first-hand experiences that appear to compel us to reflect.
It is morally repugnant to wait until most people have experienced gun violence or sufficiently
compelling events to only then correct misjudgment. If we wait for this, it will likely be too late
to take the appropriate actions. There would not be enough maneuverability to affect the
conditions that contribute to so much violence if we wait until it becomes obvious to most people
that a particular judgment on gun control is correct. More important, the trauma and cost in life is
unacceptable. To wait for certainty before action, assuming this is even possible, is to wait too
long to respond, not just to gun violence but to many of the complex decisions that we as a
nation need to be make.
Following this, it is clear that the “best case scenario” would have creative and vibrant
imaginations bringing forth answers to tragedies before they occur and thereby preventing them
from happening, or at least mitigating their harm. While this may not always be possible,
nevertheless, a cultivation of the imagination in ways of judging could allow the actual
happening of tragedies to act more powerfully as prompts for reflection, and thus encourage
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prevention of future tragedies and better mitigation of future harm. Put differently, if we
acknowledge that painful and preventable catastrophes are going to occur, then it is not enough
to simply assume that people’s common sense will generate responsible judgments when faced
with the nauseating character of future catastrophes and, then, lead to appropriate remedies. As
demonstrated in the first chapter, those hoping to enact change in the wake of tragedy cannot
presuppose that everyone shares the same common sense, nor will such common sense
necessarily prompt solidarity toward common ends.
To prevent tragedies from being “for nothing” or remaining insufficiently addressed, we
need to encourage a way of judging that can change what its judgments are when considering
tragedies like the Las Vegas shooting, such that when events display themselves as abhorrent
enough to prompt action, it is possible to imagine (and desire) a future in which they do not
occur. We need to be able to imagine events in a visceral way so that we can feel the desire to
live differently, so that we may act differently. As a result, it is essential to encourage people to
enlarge their capacity of feeling in relation to making judgments. For this, creativity is necessary
for both the attempts to prompt feeling and for the ability to be affected by something. This is
because the ability to feel something about events, especially when not directly experienced,
requires the (re)creation of something about those events to prompt feeling.
As suggested by Grossberg’s notion of cultural affective landscapes, because the issues
faced politically are necessarily collective rather than individualistic, the creative ability to feel
that Diane Davis calls affectability, cannot take place simply on an individual level if it is to have
a societal effect.145 Consequently, it is necessary for this to be a political and cultural project and
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not only a set of individualized projects. Above all, enlivening the exercise of creative potential
is essential; crafting projects that depend on sensus communis and that excite the collective
imagination and that make this excitement appealing, can help us better feel and thereby
reflectively judge the particularity of the present so that we may work toward a different future.
Still, despite the need to encourage reflection-at-a-distance, it is hard to deny the power of firsthand happenings to prompt reflection, offer the chance to alter tastes and attitudes, and
potentially excite action. Therefore, for rhetorical projects aiming to prompt reflective judgment,
it is a matter of understanding why first-hand experience can prompt reflection so powerfully
and of creating a variety of ways to work with this force. We need to craft rhetoric that invites
audiences to imagine as if they were experiencing particular events, real or hypothetical, so as to
prompt reflection and to reorient feelings about cultural and political issues. In the history of
rhetoric, there are many well-documented ways to excite a reflective imagination responsive to
the needs of the context, including amplification, reversal, and imitation.
Judging Rich Particulars, Exemplars, and the Feeling of the Feeling for Reflective
Attitudes
To help us understand how we can prompt reflective judgment and to understand the
similarities and differences between the first-hand experience and potentially motivational
second-hand images, the Kanto-Arendtian description of the imagination is helpful. Arendt in her
Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy describes the imagination as “The faculty of making
present what is absent.”146 From this description, we may gather that the imagination is
responsible for presenting us with a representation of what is not immediately at hand—it
provides an image that we can sense (feel) as much as we can understand (think). By being
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fostering communication, or serving as an “intermediary” for both our particular feelings and our
general attitudes, the terrain of the imagination seems to offer a unique place to manifest and
potentially instill different ways of feeling and understanding about the act of judging itself.
Accordingly, this imagination is essential to (re)producing images that strengthen our connection
with the particulars of the context and that prompt reflective judgment.
Before going further in regard to imagination, however, we must confront an issue of
“cause and effect.” To recognize and create rich particulars that can spark reflective judgment
already presupposes the ability of our imaginations to appreciate particular happenings beyond
the mere confirmation of our present inclinations. In other words, imagination is required to
make present particulars richly enough so that we can reflectively judge them and not
immediately subsume them under general tendencies of judgment. Reciprocally, atrophied
imaginations would have trouble appreciating the rich particulars that could encourage the
practice of reflective judgment. All shootings become the same shooting, which supports the
same feeling about shootings, for instance. A case in point is the routine, near instantaneously
made claim that any school shooting is a “false flag” operation meant to discredit gun owners
and the National Rifle Association. In essence, the project of cultivating a prejudice for reflective
judgment intertwines the rhetorical promise of rich particulars or exemplars with the potential of
the imagination to break habituated judgments of right-wing “common sense.” Both exemplars
and imagination are necessary but not sufficient, and each presupposes the other.
Therefore, if either the imagination or the appreciation of particulars in their particularity
is absent, then one has a vicious cycle of aesthetics and rhetoric, in which the sensus communis
protects hardened desires, takes pleasure in judgment being habitual and closed, and relishes a
political rhetoric of bullshit. There could not be a desire for reflective judgment without an
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attraction to the wealth of living particulars by way of an inventive imagination. Yet, there does
not seem to be an absence of the imagination and appreciation of living particulars, i.e. the
possibility for reflective judgment, as much as an atrophy (in the normative/ethical sense). These
are either latent qualities, dormant in their exercise, primarily applied to spheres “outside” the
political culture, or they are employed only in limited ways regarding our tastes within political
culture. The latent potential of using the imagination to explore different futures through the
particularities of experience is displayed most clearly through the fact that tastes have actually
changed.
Since there must be something that motivates a change of taste for such change to occur,
the challenge is to create contact with rich particulars or exemplars that can excite the
imagination to imagine differently. Here, we have at least two ways forward with regard to how
we may encourage particular tastes (and distastes) and, at least as importantly, cultivate
particular ways of tasting. Regarding the richness of particular events, in their richness certain
particulars can resist the ability of individuals to subsume them underneath their general tastes
even when there is a tendency toward generalized, habituated evaluation. In other words,
something about the quality of some events can disrupt the immediacy and comfort of making
calcified judgments about them. For example, the Parkland High School and Charleston Church
shootings are nuanced enough to resist attempts to merely incorporate them into and underneath
people’s general views of gun policy and far-right politics. These happenings invite “new”
feelings, suggest different ways of feeling and orientations to feeling, and can prompt people to
feel differently about our feelings themselves. Such a disruption is precisely the ground of
reflective judgment, wherein one acts as if they need to work from the “bottom-up” to evaluate
rather than the “top-down,” which only preserves preexisting attitudes.
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The rhetoric of exemplars is key regarding the use of rich particulars to challenge present
sentiments. Kant goes as far to refer to examples as “the go-cart of judgments.”147 Left rhetorical
projects challenging far-right politics can craft exemplars that encourage the reflective mode of
judgment itself as a general comportment, reflex, or prejudice. Arendt elaborates on the idea of
the exemplar in Kant: “The example is the particular that contains in itself, or at least is supposed
to contain, a concept or a general rule.”148 If we contrast exemplars with the idea of rich
particulars more generally, while rich particulars may be crafted to prompt reflective judgment
for a particular issue (e.g. gun control), exemplars may be understood as a specific subset of
particulars that imply or orient us to a more general attitude. For this project, this may be
interpreted as suggesting that an exemplar has the quality of being a particular that also suggests
something that applies beyond the confines of its particularity. Certain situations lend them
themselves to opening up our thinking beyond the case in point. It follows that employing
effective examples can be a rhetorical approach to cultivating the general attitude or
predisposition toward reflective judgment as an approach to taste. In essence, exemplars are
particulars that point beyond the immediacies of their particularity without abandoning the
richness that makes them valuable and effective. Thus, exemplars, through the richness of their
particularity, can serve as a model for disrupting a calcified taste for closed, far-right discourses
while simultaneously cultivating a predisposition toward the general concept or rule of reflective
judgment.
As in the above example of Abbott and Keeter reflectively judging based on their direct
experience, rhetorical actors can imagine and create exemplars to serve as a model for cultivating
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a prejudice for reflective judgment as a general way of judging. Arendt describes the use of
examples as an approach to understanding:
One may encounter or think of some table that one judges to be the best possible
table and take this as the example of how all tables actually should be: the
exemplary table (“example” comes from eximere, “to single out some
particular”). This exemplar is and remains a particular that in its very
particularity reveals the generality that otherwise could not be defined. [For
instance,] courage is like Achilles.149
Rather than provide an abstract definition, providing a model that orients someone toward a
generality can more effectively contest preconceived notions. Abstraction is too easily fortified
against; living exemplars can remain tied to specific events while suggesting or implying
generality. Instead of remaining in the general and abstract, where only present attitudes tend to
be considered, examples provide the opportunity to imagine a general principle through intuition
of the particular. Finally, examples can offer a taste of the reflective process before it has become
habituated; they resemble the act of imagining the standpoint of others by imagining the general
from the particular. In that sense, exemplars can serve as a predecessor to the critical process of
reflection upon a variety of particulars to come to decision. These examples can be attractive or
unattractive to audiences, depending on the context, so that they can be communicable to the
given audience depending on their existing tastes, attitudes, and approaches to judgment. In other
words, rather than abstractly “preaching” the virtues of reflective judgment as a habit of taste,
rhetoricians can model the attractiveness of such habits through the grasp-ability of examples.
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Through careful display of the process of reflection regarding particulars, there is the possibility
of bypassing overly rigid resistance to certain tastes by cultivating openness to (re)consideration.
From this consideration of rich particulars to encourage particular feelings and tastes, and
exemplars to cultivate general attitudes, I turn to explore how such encouragement and
cultivation might occur through different “levels” of feelings. Here, Arendt’s explanation of the
potential difference of taste and reflection upon is instructive. She writes, “It is called taste
because . . . it chooses. But this choice is itself subject to still another choice: one can approve or
disapprove of the very fact of pleasing: this too is subject to approbation or disapprobation.”150
By this, we can distinguish the immediate or “reactive” judgment of taste informed by our habits
and the more reflective judgment upon our judgment. These need not always align. Kant
provides the example of the “sorrow of a widow at the death of her excellent husband” such that
“a deep grief may satisfy the person experiencing it.”151 In this example, the reactive feeling of
the death of a loved one is displeasing, but the reflection upon this feeling, i.e. the feeling of the
feeling, may be gratifying. This means that the reflection upon the feeling and the feeling itself
need not align in whether they are pleasing. Feelings please or displease in multiple registers of
feeling.
For this project, this means that there are at least two approaches to confronting existing
unethical tastes at the aesthetic level. First, the rich particulars manifested for particular
audiences can work to prompt pleasurable or displeasurable feelings surrounding a particular
issue. As discussed above, the Parkland High School shooting can serve as a rich particular that
can prompt feelings of disgust surrounding the tragic consequences of existing gun policies in

150
151

Ibid, 69. Emphasis Original.
Ibid.

101

the United States. These aim at producing an “initial” feeling of approbation or disapprobation
by associating attractive or repulsive particulars to a given issue. By focusing on tastes
surrounding a given issue, one would try to prompt reflective judgment as a way of being
political and rhetorical within the particular scope of tastes surrounding matters like gun control,
climate change, and healthcare policy.
However, this approach has its limits. For one, when an unreflective approach to
judgment is predominant, rich particulars need to help encourage the actualization of a reflective
form of judgment in addition to prompting certain feelings. If reevaluation is to occur, the
pleasurable or displeasurable particular feelings need to be “linked up” with a general stance
toward rendering judgments. This is because the reactive taste is insufficient if it does not court
reconsideration. For example, if someone deems laissez faire gun policy to be preferable, disgust
about the Parkland shooting is insufficient if this disgust does not motivate reflection, decision,
and action to change one’s sentiments concerning gun regulation. Additionally, rich particulars
only tend to associate feelings toward reflection concerning a particular issue. The feeling of
disgust about the Parkland shooting may prompt reflection about this issue, even just this
shooting, but not necessarily cultivate a prejudice for reflective judgment as a specific taste in the
exercise human intentionality. Therefore, while this is an important approach to prompting
reflection, its gains in prompting reflection may not inculcate a habit of reflection to be
applicable across contexts.
Realizing that new stories may fail is part of the challenge–that they may not sufficiently
orient us to tackle the problems we face or counter the comforting and compelling narratives for
the status quo or reactionary tales. No outcome is assured. Nonetheless, there is greater risk in
not attempting to weaken the taste for paranoid bullshit among the far right–the maintenance of
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the “same” is already disastrous and only risks further catastrophic practices. By not addressing
the roots of resentment, i.e. democratic dissatisfaction (regardless of its virtuousness), we do not
speak to the conditions that make far-right stories and practices possible. If this root of
resentment is insufficiently addressed, then there seems to be little reason to believe that it will
resolve itself or “get better” over time. For resentment to be, there must be some failure that, if is
left to its own devices, will tend to perpetuate itself. Some may point to underlying economic
dissatisfaction, to ideology or worldview, and others to longstanding institutions of racism and
sexism. Regardless of whatever is designated as the “chief cause,” assuming such a move is
accurate, maintaining our more comfortable, rational-deliberative style of rhetorically engaging
this resentment seems naïve at best. Such efforts have proved incapable of hindering feelings of
resentment (and prove themselves incapable daily), and have failed to reorient resentment toward
more ethical ends. Reorienting rhetoric that resists far-right discourse around taste and sensus
communis aestheticus is a risk worth taking if we are to actualize more democratic and ethical
ways of living together. It is counter-intuitive, but using the tools of deliberative reason are
incapable of maintaining a culture of deliberative reason. Rebuilding a taste for reflection is
necessary for deliberative reason to flourish.
This is the promise that I believe an aesthetic orientation to rhetoric geared toward
cultivating a prejudice for reflective judgment can aid. We need an orientation that meaningfully
takes into account our ways of perceiving, tasting, and judging the world so that we may
perceive, taste, and judge differently, and perhaps better. Only if we orient ourselves toward
futures that take up what Grossberg refers to as strategic and diagnostic challenges in addition to
the important work of imagining fantastic futures, can we end up with good, decent, or at least
better ones.

103

CONCLUSION
HOW DO FASCISTS DREAM? OR ON THE LIMITS OF REFLECTIVE JUDGMENT
In recognition of the limits and risks of the approach advocated in this project, it is
incumbent on me in conclusion to consider the precarious nature of reflection. Presupposing that
reflective judgment is an ontological possibility, and that a genuine openness to particulars can
de-calcify our present tastes, it is important to ask where is reflection presently being directed?
Further, why has this been (and is) insufficient in addressing the need for tastes to change to
motivate changing ways of living in common? In other words, why has reflective judgment
failed to protect us against the rise of neo-fascism? Moreover, how might this way of judging
actually aid contemporary far-right projects?
To begin provisionally, the common and banal character of catastrophically unethical
practices can serve as an example of where democratic reflection’s atrophy or impotence serves
fascist ends. Here I examine Adolf Eichmann, one of the infamous men responsible for carrying
out the so-called final solution (i.e. the extermination of millions of Jews, Roma peoples,
homosexuals, and other “undesirables”). To consider the limits of reflective judgment to weaken
the sedimentation of resentment, I look to this infamous case of a person seemingly absent of
reflective and imaginative capacities (or at least not exercising these capacities). Indeed, Arendt
famously condemns Eichmann not for being malevolently evil, but instead for a banality of
evil—“ordinary,” human badness with extraordinary consequences.
Crucially, rather than lacking reflective judgment, Eichmann seems to display a fascistic
style of reflection. As I illustrate below, he takes up what he feels are relevant particulars to
inform his convictions and practices. Therefore, I argue that cultivating a prejudice for a
democratic style of reflective judgment needs to foster a greater quality and range of particulars,

104

and the openness to change one's ways of being from this process; it does not have to resurrect a
destroyed faculty. At least at present, though fascist reflective judgment predominantly considers
particulars that do not threaten convictions, and is therefore atrophied from a democratic point of
view, there is still reflection that is minimally amenable to democratic politics and can develop
within neo-fascist politics. This potentiality for development of democratic reflection,
imagination, and taste from their existing fascistic counterparts is a key terrain for contesting the
far right on the grounds of sensus communis aestheticus. If even Eichmann, the figure par
excellence who is purported to be without reflection displays atrophied, though nonetheless
present moments of reflection that might have been cultivated under different conditions, then it
is safe to say that Left opponents of the far right can cultivate better reflective judging toward
democratic taste, ethics, and politics.
At first glance, this example may seem extreme. Someone so unreflective can appear to
be exceptional; surely the case of Eichmann cannot apply to the more general problem of
insufficient reflective judgment with regard to taste and thought. Yet, the extreme character of
this bureaucrat of genocide provides a nearly “absolute zero” case for the place of this way to
judge in an apparently unreflective individual. It makes clearer the character of a fascistic style
of reflection that appears from a democratic point of view as unreflective. Eichmann’s apparent
“lack” of reflection provides insights into what fascistic reflection looks like and how such
reflection might sustain these practices and make them resilient. In other words, because his
character is so obviously unreflective, he provides a glimpse of the way far-right politics engages
in reflective judgment. Therefore, this individual instance can provide some traits to be
considered at a more widespread cultural level.
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In what follows, I look to the story of Eichmann and Kommerzialrat Storfer, one of the
leaders of the Viennese Jewish community during the period, to display a different way to reflect
and imagine that reinforces fascistic proclivities. Rather than a simple lack or absence in the
exercise of these faculties, I argue that a sliver of empathy contributed to the certainty of
Eichmann’s convictions and practices, not weakened them. Through this story, I suggest the
uncomfortable proposition many individuals are susceptible to far-right styles of reflective
judgment and imagination from contemporary culture. Then, drawing upon Jacques Ranciere, I
argue that this shallowness of reflection has an aesthetic register; particular categories of people
do not appear as proper political subjects to Eichmann, the National Socialist regime, and the
contemporary far right.152 Far-right sensus communis does not view Others as suitable to imagine
and reflect upon, in such a way that Others’ particularity might challenge far-right hardened
desires and convictions. Finally, I conclude by revisiting Grossberg’s statement about imagining
the death of the imagination and call for the Left to contest this aesthetic terrain and not cede it to
the far right.
Arendt in her Eichmann in Jerusalem describes his fatal character flaw as “his almost
total inability ever to look at anything from the other fellow’s point of view.”153 To some extent,
this description fits with the interpretation offered in the previous chapter. Following Arendt’s
description, Eichmann was either incapable or had no desire to reflect upon the particulars of the
situation that did not already confirm his present self. Further, he could not imagine or chose not
to imagine what it was like for the people he was initially responsible for overseeing the
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deportation, and later the deaths of. Finally, his stance was the antithesis of a broadmindedness
(epistemological) and capacity for empathy (aesthetic/affect) that an imaginative and reflective
orientation to judgment would hopefully produce. He did not feel the suffering of those he
condemned. Or, at the very least, he did not feel the suffering enough to do anything meaningful
to impede, mitigate, or prevent the Shoah (Holocaust), even within the confines of his role.
Yet, it is too simplistic to consider Eichmann, or neo-fascists generally, as devoid of the
capacity and ability to exercise reflective judgment, imagination from the standpoint of others,
and a feeling for broadmindedness and empathy. One episode about Eichmann’s encounter with
Kommerzialrat Storfer, one of the leaders of the Viennese Jewish community during the period,
displays Eichmann’s somewhat active, though severely atrophied ability to imagine and feel for
another. Since Eichmann had been placed in Vienna in 1938 to help administrate the
“emigration” (i.e. expulsion) of Jews, he felt it was worthwhile to investigate Storfer’s situation
after being informed that Storfer had been sent to Auschwitz. He felt this way because they
personally worked together in Vienna and because Eichmann believed Storfer had “always
behaved well.”154
After consulting the chief of the secret police of Vienna, Eichmann was told, “No one
could get out once he was in. Nothing could be done.” Rather than stopping at this news, he met
with Storfer and Auschwitz Commandant Höss to see how he could “resolve” the situation.
Eichmann described this meeting with Storfer as “a normal, human encounter.”155 He even
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displayed a limited degree of empathy with Storfer, telling him, “Well, my dear old friend [Ja,
mein lieber guter Storfer] . . . we certainly got it! What rotten luck!”156
Upon communicating to Storfer that he could not get him out of the camp because of his
orders, Storfer asks if he may be exempted from work. Once again, Eichmann is informed by
Höss that Storfer cannot be relieved from work duties because “everyone works here.”157
Immediately accepting this statement, Eichmann imagines a “solution,” displaying some
creativity, by simultaneously fulfilling the demand that “everyone at Auschwitz works (and/or
dies),” and still responding to Storfer’s deep dissatisfaction with his work. Eichmann decides that
Storfer will only have to “keep the gravel paths in order with a broom” and be provided a bench
to occasionally sit upon. This is deemed acceptable to both Höss and Storfer.
In retrospect, most chillingly, Eichmann describes his reflection upon the encounter with
Storfer—“It was a great inner joy to me that I could at least see the man with whom I had
worked for so many long years, and that we could speak with each other.”158 From this encounter
with someone different from him, he feels pleasure at his ability to reflect within his bounds
toward judgment and the decision to help Storfer. In this limited instance, he displays some
empathy for this individual and makes efforts to mitigate his suffering. (Though not alleviating
the suffering or the administration of the deaths of millions of other individuals). Perhaps
astonishingly, Eichmann revels in the ability to speak with this individual in a “normal human
encounter.” While clearly exceptional and limited, Eichmann still displays a level of reflection.
However, this reflection is only applied in a minor change in the fate of Storfer. Arendt writes,
“six weeks after this normal human encounter, Storfer was dead–not gassed, apparently, but
156
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shot.” Eichmann’s imagination was not imaginative enough to change the fate of Storfer, nor his
reflection reflective enough to connect this particular case with a challenge to the larger system
of extermination.
Relatedly, another vignette displays Eichmann’s ability for remorse for particular Jewish
individuals, without that remorse translating into changes in general convictions. Arendt notes:
It was not murder but, as it turned out, that he had once slapped the face of Dr. Josef
Löwenherz, head of the Vienna Jewish community, who later became one of his favorite
Jews. He apologized in front of his staff at the time, but this incident kept bothering
him.159
That Eichmann could feel remorse and the need to take corrective action for this individual Jew,
yet feel nothing, and even retrospectively a “sense of elation,” suggests the nauseating, yet
nonetheless present capacity for empathy.
From these examples, one can see how a minor moment of reflection may have helped
contribute to the continuation of genocide, and, more specifically the attitudes that help make
fascistic sentiments possible. However, this should not be interpreted to say that we should not
engage in reflective judgment, or that this way of judging necessarily serves to reinforce rather
than challenge unethical thinking, feeling, and acting in the world from the point of view of
democratic ethics. Rather, this example displays that reflective judgment, imagination, creativity,
broadmindedness, and empathy in regard to particular cases are insufficient (even if necessary)
to being ethical. One can be reflective, imaginative, and broadminded and still be unethical. For
the above example, Auschwitz was, at once, the failure of the promise of the imagination for
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democratic ethics and the actualization of creativity applied to totalitarian practice (fascistic
sentiment imaginatively intended toward repugnant ethics).
Eichmann’s infinitesimal moment of reflection served to reinforce, rather than challenge,
his practices and attitudes. Arendt describes this brief reflective moment as follows; “Eichmann
needed only to recall the past in order to feel assured that he was not lying and that he was not
deceiving himself, for he and the world he lived in had once been in perfect harmony.”160 These
“forays” into reflective judgment and their infinitesimal impact on changing the outcome of
decision-making helped reinforce the feeling that Eichmann was living a virtuous life. The sense
of being able to speak in a “normal, human way” helped restore his confidence in his practices,
rather than challenging them. His feeble attempts at broadmindedness, such as reading the
Zionist classic The Jewish State, learning Hebrew and Yiddish, and reading a Yiddish
newspaper, likely helped confirm, even inculcate anti-Semitic attitudes and practices.161 Or, the
feeling of remorse for slapping Löwenherz could have helped maintain Eichmann’s selfunderstanding that he was an empathetic individual. Thereby, his self-understanding of being
empathetic at the micro-level could have contributed to his unempathetic feelings toward the
genocidal practices he contributed to at the macro-level.
Such an affective strategy and shift in the character of reflective judgment upon
particulars was even considered by Himmler. Contrary to the understanding of an indifference or
pleasure by the perpetrators of the Holocaust, Arendt notes, “A systematic effort was made to
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weed out all those who derived physical pleasure from what they did.”162 Instead, the problem of
affective disgust or revulsion at the destruction of human beings by one’s own hands was
reoriented; these feelings were “directed toward the self [instead of against the genocidal
system].”163 Arendt describes how a concentration camp guard or administrator of Zyklon B into
a gas chamber might work through their revulsion: “Instead of saying: What horrible things I did
to people!, the murderers would be able to say: What horrible things I had to watch in the
pursuance of my duties. How heavily the task weighed upon my shoulders.”164 Through this
strategy, revulsion became a form of attraction. Instead of revulsion undermining genocidal
practices, one’s disgust demonstrated one’s commitment to duty. This was their individual
“burden” to fulfill, not cause for condemning the National Socialist regime.
To link this affective strategy to a (neo)fascistic way to judge reflectively, I turn to
Ranciere’s discussion of not seeing Others as political subjects. He writes, “If there is someone
you do not wish to recognize as a political being, you begin by not seeing them as the bearers of
politicalness, by not understanding what they say, by not hearing that it is an utterance coming
out of their mouths.”165 This is not simply ignoring others; to ignore implies that one hears yet
disregards another. To not even hear an utterance of an Other, for it to be de jure not worth
understanding or feeling is a qualitatively different phenomenon. This explains why the far right
refers to immigrants without legal recognition as illegal aliens.
When an Other is not seen as a political being, then there is no desire or reason to
recognize them as a particular that can be judged upon reflectively. Purportedly “unpolitical”
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beings are not even worthy of being understood as a particular, let alone taken up as such in
reflective judging. By not being political particulars to inform judging, they cannot be taken up
in such a way as to challenge or change one’s preexisting convictions (especially when those
convictions are dogmatically sustained through overdetermined judging). Crucially, if Others
(e.g. Jews, non-whites, so-called illegal aliens) are not taken up as particulars in reflective
judgment, then one can still reflectively judge without one’s sentiments ever being meaningfully
questioned. Even in rare moments of reflective judging, then, a fascistic approach to this way of
judging is unlikely to challenge preexisting and overdetermined judgments. If anything, fascistic
engagement with the particulars may help maintain and reinforce overdetermined judging; one
can “arrive again” at their calcified conviction by not even perceiving anything contrary to such
a conviction. Thus, like its counterpart in overdetermined judging, fascistic reflective judgment
almost inevitably cements rather than challenges their convictions.
Such failure to even perceive particulars that could prompt democratic reflective
judgment and imagination is perhaps one of the most dangerous aesthetico-ideological features
of far-right politics. I interpret Arendt designating this as “thoughtlessness.” She applies this
designation to Eichmann’s role in the Holocaust, “it was sheer thoughtlessness – something by
no means identical with stupidity – that predisposed him to become one of the greatest criminals
of that period.”166 However, following my above interpretations of the Storfer and Löwenherz
examples, I understand such thoughtlessness as a way of thinking, such lack of empathy as a way
of empathizing, such atrophy of the imagination as a way of imagining. Contesting this political
style means making the necessary particulars recognizable as particulars (e.g. undocumented
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immigrants) as a necessary condition for democratic reflective judgment. Such appreciation of
specific particulars is not simply the exercising of atrophied imagination and reflective judgment,
but also the qualitative expansion of the entities worthy of being taken up as a particular. It is at
once the fostering of new habits as much as an undoing of existing habits. For without these twin
moves, it seems the dogmatism of fascistic style, even alongside a cultivated prejudice for
reflective judgment, is too fortified against the appeals of democratic tastes, possibilities, and
ethics. A chief concern, then, seems to be the evisceration of democratic possibilities from an
ascendant far right. Far-right habitual resentment erodes the grounds on which it may be
undermined – mainly through the closing-off of the field of particularity and imagination that can
sustain democratic practices.
I conclude by revisiting Grossberg’s speculation, “Imagination dead: imagine. Is this the
fascism of our age?” But what if instead of far-right politics lacking imagination, their rhetorical
resilience stems from another way of imagining? In other words, what if their resilience is made
possible by the power of their sensus communis aestheticus, e.g. attractiveness to so-called
strong men qua Adorno and feelings of resentment qua Jeremy Engels. Neo-fascists also
creatively imagine new possibilities and cultivate sympathetic tastes. Fascists dream. This
aesthetic power must be confronted if democratic politics are to survive. Whether through the
impotence of the rational-deliberative approach, seemingly bulletproof far-right rhetoric, or selfperpetuating resentful desires, the dogmatism and calcification of this taste means it cannot be
tackled "head on." Such direct approaches have failed to foster democratic discourse. It is naïve
to think they will suddenly start working.
Aesthetics, the sphere traditionally disassociated from politics, is an indirect path to
encourage different tastes through cultivating a rich habitual way of reflecting in matters of taste.
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As Schiller writes, "If [hu]man[s] [are] ever to solve that problem of politics in practice [they]
will have to approach it through way of the aesthetic."167 Cultivated habits of reflective judgment
and imagination might foster a desire for democratic politics. The ascendance of far-right
aesthetics demonstrates the potential of this sphere for democratic politics; sensus communis
aestheticus has changed before and therefore can change again. If this is the case, it is all the
more important for those who hope to contest such imaginings and possibilities to contest this
ground–to cultivate better aesthetic proclivities through creativity that can spark criticaldemocratic imagination.
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